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 ENDING THE WAR AGAINST SEX WORK: WHY IT’S TIME 
TO DECRIMINALIZE PROSTITUTION 
LINDA S. ANDERSON* 
ABSTRACT 
Efforts to decriminalize sex work have gained momentum re-
cently. After years of abolitionist rhetoric inflaming the public by con-
flating consensual sex work with human trafficking, sex workers and 
their allies are making themselves heard. The debate about whether ex-
changing sex for money should be legal is drawing attention. Sex 
worker advocates have gathered data to support their assertions that sex 
workers are harmed by efforts to eliminate an activity that has existed 
for as long as people have lived in communities.  
This article responds to the impasse among scholarly advocates 
for decriminalizing consensual sex work. Over the last several decades, 
the voices of anti-prostitution advocates have shouted above those who 
support various forms of consensual sex work because supporters do not 
agree on a single position. This article explains why sex work was crim-
inalized, explains why constitutional and policy reasons advanced for 
decriminalizing sex work have not yet succeeded, and offers an alterna-
tive advocacy strategy that focuses on identifying and eliminating the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, 
has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to 
mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems 
of human interest and public concern.”1 
The right to act as the sole authority over one’s body in connec-
tion with medical procedures and sex is debatable, especially for 
women. Should it be the subject of debate? Why is this the case pre-
dominantly for women but not men? Is there any other facet of our lives 
where the government tells us what we can or cannot do with our bod-
ies? 
Let’s take a brief look at what we are allowed to do with our 
bodies. We can overeat, not exercise, and become so obese that we need 
assistance with activities of daily living. We can starve ourselves to be-
come thin enough that modeling agencies will pay to use our image to 
sell clothes or other products. We can allow someone to insert ink into 
our skin to create tattoos for all to see. We can train and exercise to build 
and sculpt the structure of our body to gain notoriety through bodybuild-
ing competitions. We can pose nude for artists to capture our image and 
sell their rendering of our body for their profit. We can live in clothing-
optional communities, carrying on our daily lives, inside and outside, 
completely or partially nude. We can offer our bodies for medical ex-
perimentation through drug trials. We can work as gynecological med-
ical models, allowing a series of medical students to prod and probe our 
genitalia and reproductive organs while others observe. We can use our 
reproductive capacity to create and nurture a genetically related embryo, 
carry it to term, deliver it, and then give it to someone else to raise. We 
can offer our reproductive capacity to carry someone else’s embryo and 
deliver someone else’s baby. Yet, for some reason, we cannot offer our 
body for sex if we do so in exchange for money. 
Many of the ways I just described as legitimate uses of our body 
involve earning money. Modeling, for clothing and products as well as 
nude modeling for artists, generates income. Participating in medically 
supervised drug trials involves an exchange of service for money. Gy-
necological medical models get paid an hourly rate or a salary. Yet we 
cannot offer our body for sex if that offer involves the exchange of 
money or something of value for the sex. 
 
1 Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 
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As a woman, I can choose to be a swinger, have a poly relation-
ship, have an affair, maintain an open relationship, have multiple 
“friends with benefits” partners, have sex with other women, men, or 
both. I can engage in threesomes, gang bangs, and orgies. I can work as 
an erotic dancer and get paid or get paid to have sex on camera to make 
commercial porn. I can also tacitly agree to have sex with someone in 
exchange for dinner out or some other sort of social activity. All of this 
is legal. 
Some may believe that some, or even all of these activities are 
immoral, but none are criminal. Yet, if I engaged in any sort of sex act 
with someone and charged them a fee, I would commit a crime. And 
yes, some people would also think what I was doing was immoral. But 
why does my morality or lack thereof matter to them? And what makes 
taking money for sex criminal when getting paid for having sex in front 
of a production crew and camera that produce a film which is then dis-
tributed for someone else’s profit, and getting paid to do so is not a 
crime? 
Commercial sex work has existed as far back as we can docu-
ment.2 We refer to prostitution as the world’s oldest profession, but it 
wasn’t always a crime.3 Efforts to criminalize sex work in the United 
States began around the time Congress passed the Mann Act, which was 
also known as the White Slave Trade Act.4 Enacted around the time 
many people were immigrating from Asia, the underlying purpose of 
the Mann Act focused on preventing immigration and discouraging the 
dilution of the white race.5 At the same time, the Mann Act had support 
because it criminalized behavior that many found distasteful, if not im-
moral.6 This comprehensive legislation, originally enacted in 1910, 
made it a federal felony to knowingly transport women across state bor-
ders and into the United States from other countries, for prostitution, 
debauchery, or other “immoral purposes.”7   
But society’s views about sex have changed. Most states have 
repealed criminal laws against fornication and adultery, making these 
types of consensual sexual activity legally tolerated.8 Over time, as 
views about marriage and sexuality became more diverse, additional 
 
2 JESSICA PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 16–19 
(2014). 
3 Id. 
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2429 (2018). 
5 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 16–19. 
6 See, Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection. Of Race and Gender 
in the Progresive Era, 8 YALE J. OF LAW & FEMINISM 31, 59 (1996). 
7 18 U.S.C. § 2422. 
8 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 16–19. 
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restrictions and prohibitions were removed. Laws prohibiting interracial 
marriage were found unconstitutional,9 married couples were allowed 
access to contraception,10 unmarried individuals were eventually 
granted access to contraception,11 private, adult consensual sexual be-
havior was protected from government intervention,12 and eventually, 
the right to marry a person of one’s choosing, regardless of gender was 
recognized.13 
Similarly, if we step back and look at the commercial sex indus-
try with a wider lens, we see that many types of commercial sex activi-
ties are legal. To the chagrin of some, the First Amendment legally pro-
tects pornography.14 In fact, those who create pornography as actors are 
paid to engage in sexual activity whereas the same activity for pay in 
any other setting would be illegal.15 Stripping, including providing lap 
dances for pay and tips is legal commercial sexual activity.16 Erotic 
dancing, phone sex, and most forms of BDSM17 are legal commercial 
sexual activities, despite being disdained by some members of today’s 
society.18 
So what sets prostitution, the private, consensual exchange of 
sexual activity for money, apart from these other forms of commercial 
 
9 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
11 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
12 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
13 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
14 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that community standards about 
whether material is obscene must be used to determine whether material loses First Amendment 
protection) (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (recognizing that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous”). 
15 See California v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Cal. 1988) (distinguishing payment of acting 
fees for actor who engaged in sex acts for adult film from payment for prostitution that is pay-
ment for “sexual arousal or gratification.”) 
16 Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (holding “nude dancing is not without its 
First Amendment protections”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (con-
cluding that nude dancing falls “within the outer perimeters” of conduct protected by First 
Amendment). 
17 BDSM refers to the practices of bondage, domination, sadism, and masochism. See Nuna 
Alberts, What Is BDSM? Fundamentals, Types and Roles, Safety Rules, and More, Everyday 
Health, https://www.everydayhealth.com/hehealt-sex/bdsm/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). 
18 Because BDSM takes so many forms, it is possible that some activities that fall within this 
practice may be illegal. But in general, the practice of consensual BDSM is not illegal. See 
Simon Davis, We Asked a Law Professor Whether the Government Could Really Ban Rough 
Sex, VICE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en/article/vdxav4/we-asked-a-law-professor-
if-bdsm-could-be-legally-banned (interviewing UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh in light 
of a Virginia court’s ruling that a defendant had no constitutional right to engage in BDSM 
activity). 
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sexual activity and causes it to be criminalized? Why do we criminalize 
this particular form of sex work and no other? 
This article will consider why the private, consensual exchange 
of sex for money, also referred to as commercial sex work, is criminal-
ized and will argue that all commercial sex work should be decriminal-
ized.19 It will look at the history, the law and policy, and the harm asso-
ciated with criminalizing prostitution.20 And it will explain why now is 
the time to decriminalize sex work and protect those who do this work.21 
A. Terminology – Language is important 
Because the language we use when talking about behavior can 
have profound effects on how that behavior is viewed, this section will 
define the way this article uses certain terms.  
i. Prostitution versus sex work 
Throughout the article, I will use the terms prostitution and com-
mercial sex work, or at times simply sex work. I will also use the de-
scriptive phrase private, consensual exchange of sexual activity for 
money. These terms are often used interchangeably, and I will do so 
here, but it is important to understand that in many contexts the terms 
have important differences.  Commercial sex work encompasses many 
different activities that involve sex or erotic services. Anyone who en-
gages in an erotic service for money or something of value could be 
included in the phrase sex work. This includes legal activities as well as 
those that are illegal.22  
Prostitution, the private, consensual exchange of sexual activity 
for money is a subset of commercial sex work that is currently illegal.23 
Generally, the distinction turns on whether there is any genital contact 
designed to provide sexual stimulation.  But people who work as strip-
pers, cam girls, phone sex operators, tantric sex instructors, or profes-
sional dominatrices are often included in the broad category of sex 
worker even though they provide legal erotic services.24 
 
19 See infra Parts II, V.  
20 See infra Parts III–IV. 
21 See infra Parts V–VI. 
22 See STUART P. GREEN, CRIMINALIZING SEX 295–300 (2020) (providing a brief explanation of 
the various ways prostitution is defined, and what activities are included within those defini-
tions). 
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
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Recently, the exchange of sexual services for money or other 
things of value has been referred to as sex work or commercial sex work 
because many who advocate for decriminalization of all sex work see 
the service provided as work just like other income-producing activities 
are described as work. Consequently, because this article focuses on the 
fight to decriminalize prostitution, and those who engage in the sale of 
sex for money or something of value prefer the term sex work, I will 
respect their preference and will frequently use the term sex work. How-
ever, because sex work is a relatively new way to describe this, when 
looking back at the history of such activity, I will often revert to the use 
of the word prostitution when describing times when that was the com-
mon term. Additionally, when attempting to determine why sex work 
differs from other personal decisions about sex, I will sometimes de-
scribe it as the private, consensual exchange of sexual activity for 
money. In all of these references I mean what has most traditionally 
been referred to as prostitution. 
Key in these terms is the requirement that the exchange of sexual 
services for money or other value occurs between consenting adults. My 
focus here is on commercial sex work that is currently illegal, so refer-
ences to that type of work should be interpreted as focusing on illegal 
sex work rather than other forms of legal sex work. 
The goal of this article is to recognize that the time has come to 
decriminalize commercial sex work. Following this Introduction (Part 
I), which explains the distinctions between legal sex work and illegal 
sex work, Part II begins by exploring how and why sex work became 
criminalized.25 Understanding the historical reasons that led to the cur-
rent illegality of sex work allows us to see how those reasons are no 
longer relevant.  
Part III explores some of the constitutional arguments that have 
been made to argue that individuals have the right to engage in sex work 
unrestricted by state prohibitions or regulations.26 Because sex work 
necessarily involves sex and decisions regarding the way one uses one’s 
body, the liberty and privacy interests associated with these issues have 
been bandied about in connection with discussions about decriminaliz-
ing sex work.  
Part IV follows as a transition between the more theoretical legal 
arguments and the practical reality that supports decriminalizing sex 
work.27 It offers an assessment of the potential interests a state may raise 
 
25 See infra Part II. 
26 See infra Part III. 
27 See infra Part IV. 
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for continuing to outlaw sex work. That assessment demonstrates the 
lack of viability of these positions, providing a segue to Part V,28 where 
the practical and critically important reasons to decriminalize sex work 
are explored. Part VI concludes the article by describing a path forward 
that focuses on continued grassroots efforts to shift public and legisla-
tive opinions enough that proposals for legislation decriminalizing sex 
work can be successfully enacted.29 
ii. Sex work/prostitution versus sex trafficking 
It is important to avoid conflating sex work or prostitution with 
sex trafficking. A significant part of my analysis will criticize those who 
do so. The distinction between sex work and sex trafficking is critical 
because conflating the two makes it too easy to find reasons to continue 
to criminalize sex work in the false hope of preventing sex trafficking. 
Sex trafficking is a subset of human trafficking. According to 
the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffick-
ing in Persons Protocol, Especially Women and Children (the U.N. Hu-
man Trafficking Protocol),  
“(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve 
the consent of a person having control over another per-
son, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall 
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitu-
tion of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;  
“(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to 
the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of 
this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set 
forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;  
“(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall 
be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does 
 
28 See infra Part V. 
29 See infra Part VI. 
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not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph 
(a) of this article;  
“(d) ‘Child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years 
of age.”30 
Note that human trafficking is not limited to sex trafficking. As 
noted in the purpose and findings section of the United States federal 
law that implements the agreements of the U.N. Protocol, human traf-
ficking occurs in connection with other forms of labor as well,31 but the 
sex trafficking aspect garners the most attention. 
The provisions of the U.N. Human Trafficking Protocol are in-
corporated into the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 
(TVPA),32 but the TVPA is more inclusive, expanding the definition of 
sex trafficking to include more than the exploitation of people. The Act 
defines a commercial sex act as “any sex act on account of which any-
thing of value is given to or received by any person.”33 According to the 
TVPA, “[t]he term ‘sex trafficking’ means the recruitment, harboring, 
transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a per-
son for the purpose of a commercial sex act.”34  The Act also includes a 
definition of severe forms of sex trafficking: 
(A) Sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is in-
duced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the 
person induced to perform such acts has not attained 
18 years of age, or 
(B) The recruitment, harboring, transportation, provi-
sion, or obtaining a person for labor services, through 
the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purposes 
of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt 
bondage, or slavery.35 
The TVPA, as amended by the Justice for Victims of Trafficking 
Act, makes it a crime to use force, fraud, or coercion to make an adult 
 
30 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime with Protocols (Palermo 
Convention) Annex II: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
cially Women and Children (Human Trafficking Protocol) ratified by the President Oct. 19, 
2005 (entered into force Dec. 3, 2005) 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.  
31 See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(3) (2018) (“Trafficking in persons is not limited to the sex indus-
try”). 
32 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7114 (2018). 
33 Id. § 7102(4). 
34 Id. § 7102(12). 
35 Id. § 7102(11). 
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engage in commercial sex.36 When sex trafficking involves individuals 
under eighteen years of age, the statute does not require a demonstration 
of force, fraud, or coercion; engaging in a commercial sex act with a 
minor is a criminal act whether there is coercion or not.37  
Put more simply, anyone who engages in commercial sexual ac-
tivity without consent is involved in sex trafficking, as either a victim 
or a perpetrator. Adult victims who are coerced, forced, or fraudulently 
induced to engage in sex work have not consented, and are therefore 
victims of sex trafficking. Individuals under the age of 18 who engage 
in commercial sex work cannot legally consent to this work, so they are 
also victims of sex trafficking.38 
Though an initial review of the TVPA might suggest that it cap-
tures all forms of commercial sex, whether coerced or not, within its 
penalties, the only enforcement mechanisms in the statute apply to se-
vere forms of sex trafficking or sex trafficking of minors.39 However, 
reauthorizations of the TVPA in 2005 and 2008 added significant levels 
of funding for states to prosecute those who engaged in commercial sex, 
even if not coerced.40 
B. Listening to sex workers 
When considering issues around sex work we must avoid limit-
ing the analysis to theoretical and abstract ideas alone. To inform the 
more abstract ideas one must include sex workers’ voices and experi-
ences, and real data about sex work. Beginning shortly after September 
11th, efforts to combat human trafficking increased.41 Most of the ad-
vocacy and resulting legislation focused on sex trafficking. The distinc-
tion between sex work and sex trafficking blurred. Public discussion of 
the efforts to combat sex trafficking has not distinguished between traf-
ficking victims and those who engage in consensual sex work.42 
 
36 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1591 (2018). 
37 Id. § 1591.  
38 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11)(A)(2018). 
39 Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and 
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1679 (2010). 
40 See Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, The Missing “P”: Prosecution, Prevention, Protection, 
and Partnership in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 117 PENN. STATE L. REV. 443, 467 
(2012). 
41 Kevin D. DeCeoursty, Human Trafficking and U.S. Government Responses Post-9/11 (Sept. 
2016) (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with Homeland Security Digital 
Library). 
42 Regina A. Russo, Online Sex Trafficking Hysteria: Flawed Policies, Ignored Human Rights, 
and Censorship, 68 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 314, 340–41 (2020). 
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Consequently, much of the recent legislative efforts to combat sex traf-
ficking have had harmful effects on sex workers.43 
As a result of discourse around the TVPA, the tendency to con-
flate prostitution and sex trafficking increased. Advocates consistently 
used images and narratives that reinforced the idea of trafficking as 
modern-day slavery, which made it almost impossible to consider that 
anyone might voluntarily choose to engage in sex work.44 By control-
ling the narrative in this manner, those advocating for the prohibition of 
all sex work shifted the complicated issues of trafficking—immigration, 
labor, and poverty issues—to the moral problem of sexual violence 
against women and girls.45 But they ignored the voices of those women 
and others involved in consensual sex work, specifically contradicting 
individuals who asserted they freely choose sex work.46 
In addition to having lived experiences as sex workers, those en-
gaged in this work have much greater insight into the way victims are 
trafficked for sex, and what steps we can take to reduce trafficking and 
the harm it causes to the victims. Unfortunately, those most affected by 
overbroad and overzealous efforts to combat sex trafficking have been 
ignored or purposely silenced.47 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEX WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 
Prostitution was not criminalized nationwide in the United 
States until 1910, around the time that abortion and alcohol were also 
prohibited.48 Before that time prostitution and brothels existed legally, 
especially in areas with a low ratio of women to men.49  
 
43 See, V. Blue, How sex censoring killed the internet we love, ENGADGET (Jan. 31, 2019) 
https://www.engadget.com/2019-01-31-sex-censorship-killed-internet-fosta-sesta.html. “In 
2018, an estimated 42 million sex workers worldwide were evicted from the open internet and 
essentially went into hiding with the passage of FOSTA-SESTA.” See also, DANIELLE BLUNT 
& ARIEL WOLF, ERASED: THE IMPACT OF FOSTA-SESTA 2-3 (2020), https://hackinghus-
tling.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/HackingHustling-Erased.pdf.  
44 Chuang, supra note 39, at 1699. 
45 Chuang, supra note 39, at 1694. 
46 Chuang, supra note 39, at 1664–65. Chuang describes the radical feminist position as one 
that “recognize[s] no distinction between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ prostitution” and insists that 
“[w]omen who (believe they) choose prostitution suffer from a ‘false consciousness,’ the ina-
bility to recognize their own oppression; whether or not these ‘prostituted women’ seemingly 
consent.” Chuang, supra note 39, at 1664–65 (footnotes omitted). 
47 Russo, supra note 42, at 318. 
48 Dannia Altemimei, Prostitution and the Right to Privacy: A Comparative Analysis of Current 
Law in the United States and Canada, U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 630 (2013).   
49 See Scott Wasserman Stern, The Long American Plan: The U.S. Government’s Campaign 
Against Venereal Disease and its Carriers, 38 HARV. J. OF L. & GENDER 373, 381–86 (2015). 
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In addition to frontier towns where most of the population was 
male, prostitutes tended to be found in areas where soldiers were gath-
ered.50 During the Civil War, some commanding officers attempted to 
protect their soldiers from the sexually transmitted diseases thought to 
be a consequence of engaging with prostitutes before medical control of 
sexually transmitted infections, especially syphilis.51 Though some mil-
itary leaders tolerated prostitution, others attempted to restrict it. For 
example, one general around Nashville, Tennessee rounded up all of the 
prostitutes and sent them off on a riverboat, hoping to rid the area of the 
temptation.52 Unable to find a suitable place to relocate, the riverboat 
eventually returned to Nashville, where a compromise was 
reached.53The prostitutes were allowed to return but the city required 
that they undergo health screening and issued licenses to ensure that 
they had done so.54 This was one of the early efforts to regulate prosti-
tution. After the Civil War, this type of regulation continued in many 
locations, allowing the existence of legal brothels as long as the workers 
underwent health checks and the brothel owners obtained licenses.55  
Anti-prostitution legislation was born as part of anti-immigra-
tion legislation. The Page Act of 1875—the precursor to the 1882 Chi-
nese Exclusion Act that severely restricted who could immigrate from 
China—was the first federal legislation crafted to limit Chinese immi-
gration, especially the immigration of immoral women from China.56 
Following the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act Congress passed additional 
legislation aimed at restricting immigration.57 The Immigration Act of 
1903 and the Immigration Act of 1907 both expanded the criteria for 
exclusion in ways designed to prevent prostitution.58 The 1903 Act 
added exclusions for those who procured prostitutes; the 1907 Act ex-
cluded anyone who admitted to crimes of moral turpitude and any 
 
50 Id. at 382–83. 
51 See Angela Serratore, The Curious Case of Nashville’s Frail Sisterhood, SMITHSONIAN MAG. 





55 Kaytlin Bailey, U.S. History from a Whore’s Eye View, YOUTUBE (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pxrAAj8vqyg&feature=youtu.be. 
56 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 18. 
57 Walter A. Ewing, Opportunity and Exclusion: A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Policy, 
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women who acknowledged they were entering the United States for im-
moral purposes.59 
The 1910 Mann Act took a step further, extending the reach of 
efforts to restrict prostitution beyond immigration restrictions to prohi-
bitions within the country’s borders as well.60 This broadly drafted leg-
islation, also known as the White Slave Act, purported to protect white 
women from slavery.61 Fueled by public fear stoked by stories of black 
men abducting white girls and women to service nonwhite clients62 and 
the Supreme Court’s 1903 ruling that morality standards could support 
the use of the Commerce Clause to restrict the interstate transport of 
lottery tickets,63 the Mann Act made it illegal to transport, or facilitate 
the transport of white women across state lines “for the purpose of pros-
titution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.”64 Also in 
1910, Congress strengthened existisng Immigration statutes to allow for 
the deportation of anyone engaged in prostitution who had immigrated 
to the United States, regardless of when that person arrived.65 As a re-
sult, most of the prostitution that occurred throughout the country be-
came illegal. 
In addition to the fear of interracial sexual relationships, public 
health concerns formed the basis for anti-prostitution legislation and its 
enforcement.  These public health concerns led to numerous state laws 
that prohibited prostitution and promiscuity.66 Around the beginning of 
the United States’ involvement in World War I, military leaders used 
the resources available to them to reduce access to prostitutes in the ar-
eas around military training camps.67 Sexually transmitted diseases as-
sociated with prostitution and promiscuity were viewed as national se-
curity concerns because of their potential to weaken the strength of the 
military.68 Military resources were used to provide medical treatment 
 
59 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 34. 
60 The Mann Act, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/unforgivable-blackness/mann-act/ (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2021). 
61 Id. 
62 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 25. 
63 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903) (holding that a state could forbid lottery ticket 
sales to “guard[] the morals of its own people,” so Congress could do the same through the 
Commerce Clause). 
64 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 67. 
65 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 75. 
66 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 118. 
67 Stern, supra note 49, at 382–83. 
68 Stern, supra note 49, at 382–83. 
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and health checks for soldiers who could not restrain themselves.69 Ad-
ditionally, using the newly formed Commission on Training Camp Ac-
tivities, military leaders created a “moral zone” around military training 
camps, banning alcohol and prostitution within their limits.70  As a result 
of the enforcement of the moral zones surrounding military training 
camps, women were prosecuted for engaging in prostitution, yet men 
were provided medical services if they made use of a prostitute’s ser-
vices.71 
The potential for venereal disease to decimate the military forces 
led Congress to pass the Chamberlin-Kahn Act in 1918, which funded 
state efforts to detain and test citizens for sexually transmitted dis-
eases.72 This legislation, and state laws that came about as a result of it, 
allowed public health officials to “quarantine persons who ha[d], or 
who, after examination, [were] reasonably suspected of having syphilis, 
gonorrhea, or chancroid” until they became non-infectious.73 Women 
were detained and forced to undergo intrusive medical examinations for 
venereal diseases.74 If found to be infected, they were institutionalized 
and treated with arsenic and mercury until they were either cured of the 
infection or died.75 Though utilized less frequently after World War II, 
these laws remained in effect until the 1970s.76 
Criminalization of prostitution, with little, if any, consequences 
for their clients, continued until the 1970s when brothel owners in parts 
of Nevada won the right to operate legally, subject to strict regulation.77 
Though parts of Nevada currently allow legal prostitution in heavily 
regulated brothels, the rest of the United States jurisdictions continue to 
criminalize prostitution.78 
The 1970s brought a period of revolution, giving reinvigorating 
the feminist movement, civil rights movement, and the disability rights 
 
69 Susan L. Speaker, Fit to Fight: Home Front Army Doctors and VD During WWI, U.S. NAT’L 
LIBR. OF MED. (Oct. 18, 2018), https://circulatingnow.nlm.nih.gov/2018/10/18/fit-to-fight-
home-front-army-doctors-and-vd-during-ww-i/. 
70 Stern, supra note 49, at 383. 
71 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 121. 
72 Chamberlain-Kahn Act, ch. XV, §§ 4-6, 40 Stat. 845 (1918). 
73 Stern, supra note 49, at 387–88. 
74 Stern, supra note 49, at 387. 
75 Stern, supra note 49, at 388. 
76 Stern, supra note 49, at 417, 419. 
77 Richard Symanski, Prostitution in Nevada, 64 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 
357, 359 (1974). 
78 See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
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movement.79 Sex workers became involved in all of these efforts, but 
most visibly in parts of the feminist movement and parts of the LGBTQ 
movement.80 
A. Current status of criminalization of sex work in the United 
States  
Except for ten rural counties in Nevada, sex work is criminalized 
throughout the United States.81 Federal law prohibits anyone who in-
tends to engage in prostitution, or who has done so within the last ten 
years, from entering the country legally or from changing their immi-
gration status if they already reside in the country.82 The original aspects 
of the Mann Act prohibiting one from bringing an alien into the country 
for prostitution or other immoral purposes still exists, though now the 
reference to immoral purposes refers more broadly to purposes consid-
ered criminal sexual activities.83 This same expanded language has been 
altered in the statutes prohibiting the transport of individuals across state 
lines for purposes of prostitution.84 
All fifty states make engaging in prostitution and purchasing sex 
criminal acts, though the type of crime and associated penalties differ.85 
For prostitution, sixteen states impose fines and incarceration that can 
exceed six months for the first offense.86 These same sixteen states and 
four additional states impose fines and potential incarceration that can 
 
79 See How the Civil Rights Movement Launched the Fight for LGBT, Women’s Equality, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Sep. 2, 2013 6:27 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/civil-rights-
launched-the-fight-for-lgbt-women-s-equality. 
80 Lindsey H. Jemison, Feminist Theory and Sex Work Regulation: Comparing Regulatory 
Models and Implementation of Theoretical Policy, J.L. SOC’Y 163, 170-71 (2021).   
81 ProCon.org, US Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related Punishments, PROCON.ORG 
(May 4, 2018), https://prostitution.procon.org/us-federal-and-state-prostitution-laws-and-re-
lated-punishments/. 
82 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (2018). 
83 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (2018). 
84 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 2421 (2018).  
85  ProCon.org, supra, note 81. 
86 Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-122, 13A-5-7 (2018); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
13-3214, 13-707 (2014); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-82, 53a-26 (2016); Georgia, 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-9, 16-6-13(a)(2), 17-10-3 (2019); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-
14, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-55 (2019); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 35-45-4-2, 35-50-3-2 
(2018); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 725.1, 903.1 (2015); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 
53A (2011); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.448-449, 750.451 (2017); Minnesota, MINN. 
LAWS §§ 609.324 (Subd. 7), 609.0341 (2020); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.007, 161.615(1) 
(2018); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5902, 1104(3) (2011); South Dakota, S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-23-1, 22-23-9, 22-6-2 (2019); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2631; 
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-346, 18.2-11(a) (2020); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. §§ 944.30, 
939.51(3)(a) (2013). 
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exceed six months on those purchasing sex as well,87 though six of those 
states have different penalties for the purchaser.88  
B. Current social and political perspectives about commercial sex 
work 
The sex work community is diverse, composed of female, male 
and transgender sex workers; lesbian, gay and bi-sexual sex workers; 
male sex workers who identify as heterosexual; sex workers living with 
HIV and other diseases; sex workers who use drugs; young adult sex 
workers (between the ages of 18 and 29 years old); documented and 
undocumented migrant sex workers, as well as and displaced persons 
and refugees; sex workers living in both urban and rural areas; disabled 
sex workers; and sex workers who have been detained or incarcerated.89 
 Despite the variety among sex workers, most discussion of 
whether it should continue to be criminalized focuses on cisgender 
women and cisgender women’s issues. 
Even among feminists, tensions exist, if not an all-out battle. 
Broadly speaking, feminists recognize inequality based on sex and gen-
der.90 They work to create equal power, opportunity, and status for both 
women and men.91 Feminists can be divided into three camps: aboli-
tionists,92 partial abolitionists,93 and sex-positive or liberal feminists.94 
 
87 The additional states are Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6421, 21-6602; Montana, MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-5-601(2)(b); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. §§39-13-514, 40-35-111(e)(1); and 
Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1303, 76-3-204(1). 
88 See supra notes 86–87. Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Tennessee and Utah 
differentiate between those selling sex and those purchasing it within their statutory prohibi-
tions. Id. 
89 Decriminalisation: The Smart Sex Worker’s Guide, NSWP GLOBAL NETWORK OF SEX 
WORKER PROJECTS (2020) https://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/sg_to_decriminalisa-
tion_prf05.pdf (unnumbered introductory page). 
90 See Sex Work and Feminism: a guide on the feminist principles of sex worker organizing, Sex 
Workers’ Rights Advocacy Network 2 https://swannet.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2021/03/Sex_Work_and_Feminism_ENG_SnglPgs.pdf. 
91 Feminism Needs Sex Workers, Sex Workers Need Feminism: Towards a Sex-Worker Inclusive 
Women’s Rights Movement, 4 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF SEX WORKERS IN 
EUROPE (March 2016) https://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/Femi-
nism%20Needs%20Sex%20Workers%2C%20Sex%20Workers%20Need%20Femi-
nism%2C%20ICRSE%20-%202016.pdf 
92 See, e.g. Chuang, supra note 39, at 1664-1671.. 
93 Jane E. Larson, Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights, 37 U.C.Davis L. Rev. 673, 681 
(2004). 
94 See, Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Sex Work: Erotic Assimilationism, Erotic Exceptional-
ism, and the Challenge of Intimate Labor, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1195, 1209 (2015). 
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Each of these groups has differing views about inequality and how to 
address it.95 
i. Abolitionists 
One of the more vocal groups of feminists is the abolitionists, 
sometimes referred to as radical feminists.96 Led by scholars and activ-
ists such as Catharine MacKinnon97 and Andrea Dworkin,98 radical fem-
inists believe that women, as a biological class, are oppressed by men 
who maintain their power through institutional and cultural practices 
designed to maintain and potentially increase male superiority while re-
inforcing female inferiority.99 Today’s radical feminists continue to es-
pouse the beliefs and goals of the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 
1960s and 1970s. Radical feminists work to unite all women in an effort 
to end domination by the male patriarchy.100 This group of feminist ac-
tivists “view[ ] sexual oppression as the root and model of all oppression 
in society.”101 
In addition to radical feminists, two other groups belong to the 
abolitionist camp: neoconservatives102 and evangelical Christians.103 
The members of this unlikely alliance agree on two points that allow 
them to speak with one voice about sex work and sex trafficking. All 
three groups want prostitution abolished and consider it exploitative and 
 
95 ANDREA J. NICHOLS, SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES: THEORY, RESEARCH, POLICY, 
AND PRACTICE 25 (2016). 
96 See, Chuang, supra, note 39, at 1664. 
97 Catharine MacKinnon is the Elizabeth A. Long Professor of Law at the University of Mich-
igan Law School. She has also been the James Barr Ames Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard 
Law School since 2009. 
98 Andrea Dworkin was a radical feminist and author best known for her work in the anti-por-
nography and anti-prostitution movements. 
99 See generally BARBARA BURRIS, THE FOURTH WORLD MANIFESTO, reprinted in RADICAL 
FEMINISM 322 (Anne Koedt, et al. eds., 1976). (explaining the beliefs and goals of the Women’s 
Liberation Movement) 
100 Voichita Nachescu, Radical Feminism and the Nation: History and Space in the Political 
Imagination of Second-Wave Feminism, 3 J. FOR STUDY RADICALISM 29–30 (2009). 
101 Id. at 45. 
102 Neoconservatives refers to a network of people who share similar outlooks about conserva-
tive cultural and religious values combined with a focus on interventionist foreign policy and 
conservative economic approaches. Terrance Beal & Richard Dagger, Neoconservatism, 
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, (MAY 3, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/neoconservatism.  
103 Evangelicals churches are those that “stress the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ, per-
sonal conversion experiences, Scripture as the sole basis for faith, and active evangelism (the 
winning of personal commitments to Christ).” J. Gordon Melton, Evangelical Church, ENCYC. 
BRITANNICA, (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Evangelical-church-Protestant-
ism. 
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degrading to women.104 They characterize prostitution as a form of vio-
lence.105 
The neoconservative and evangelical Christian groups view the 
need to criminalize prostitution with the ultimate goal of abolishing it 
through a religious or morals-based lens.106 They focus on keeping sex 
confined to heterosexual, monogamous marriage.107 To the chagrin of 
the feminists in this alliance, the neoconservatives and evangelical 
Christians view women’s sexual vulnerability as natural and proper.108 
Whether based on religious beliefs or views about societal structure, 
non-feminist abolitionists recognize that society’s views are shifting or 
have already shifted. By fighting to keep prostitution criminalized they 
fight to retain or re-establish the old patriarchal structure with which 
they are more comfortable.109 
Among the abolitionist feminists, some do not accept the idea 
that a woman could choose or consent to engage in prostitution, instead 
asserting that women who engage in prostitution have a false conscious-
ness that prevents them from recognizing their oppression, making them 
unable to meaningfully consent.110 Often referred to as radical feminists, 
this subset of feminists view gender and sex inequality on a broad social 
scale, focusing on the patriarchal conditions that oppress all women.111 
They focus on the common experiences of all women to effect larger 
societal change.112 Making no distinctions between sex trafficking, 
prostitution, and pornography, radical feminists believe that all 
women’s agency is “reduced through the sexual objectification of 
women in sexual commerce.”113 
Others accept that some women may freely choose or consent to 
engage in sex work but posit that so few women freely choose sex work 
in comparison to those who do not make that choice that the harm im-
posed on the women making the voluntary choice is de minimus and 
must be tolerated to protect the true victims.114 
 
104 Chuang, supra note 39, at 1658. 
105 Chuang, supra note 39, at 1664. 
106 Chuang, supra note 39, at 1665. 
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While the feminist abolitionists view prostitution as an example 
of the problems of a patriarchal society, neoconservatives and evangel-
ical Christians want to abolish prostitution to maintain a patriarchal so-
ciety.115 Neoconservatives and evangelical Christians believe prostitu-
tion contradicts “traditional social values rooted in heterosexual, 
patriarchal marriage and family,” which is the only place to express sex-
uality.116 
Though both points of view within the abolitionist group lead to 
prohibiting prostitution, the reasons for doing so exist as polar oppo-
sites: patriarchy rules versus patriarchy as the evil to be eradicated.117 
Despite their differences, the united voice of abolitionists has success-
fully shaped the messaging about trafficking to focus on the victimiza-
tion of women and girls. 
ii. Partial Abolitionists 
Most feminists who advocate for the prohibition of prostitution 
also view those who engage in commercial sex as victims.118 They rec-
ognize the harm that results from being arrested and continuing to en-
gage in the world with a criminal record.119 Consequently, many femi-
nists, including some radical feminists, support partial 
decriminalization, or what is known as the Nordic model, or end-de-
mand model of criminalization.120 
The Nordic model decriminalizes those who sell sex—the pros-
titutes themselves—but criminalizes all other aspects of sex work.121 
Under this model, those who exchange sex for money are provided with 
social services and assistance to leave the industry rather than being 
considered criminals.122 Those who purchase sex are subject to arrest 
and sanctions, including criminal sanctions.123 The Nordic model also 
criminalizes those who promote or profit from prostitution—the pimps 
and owners of brothels and massage parlors.124 
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HUM. RTS. L. REV. 391, 401 (2005). 
121 Dempsey, supra note 107, at 1749–50. 
122 Dempsey, supra note 107, at 1749–50. 
123 Sylvia Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 CAL. L. REV. 523, 567–68 
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iii. Liberal Feminists 
Liberal feminists focus on individual rights and choices.125 Un-
like radical feminists who take a top-down approach to eliminate op-
pression, liberal feminists focus on oppression at the individual level.126 
Liberal feminists believe women should have the ability to 
choose to engage in sex work, recognizing that making that choice can 
be financially rewarding and empowering.127 By supporting the choice 
to engage in sex work, liberal feminists challenge societal ideas about 
traditional femininity, monogamy, and sexual purity.128 Like the radical 
feminists, liberal feminists are concerned about patriarchal control of 
women, but liberal feminists view legislation that prohibits prostitution 
as the attempt to control women’s sexuality, rather than protection from 
patriarchal views of women as sex objects.129 
Liberal feminists support the full decriminalization of sex work, 
distinguishing voluntary sex work from trafficking.130 The critical in-
flection point between radical feminists and their liberal counterparts is 
the latter’s position that the “agency of individuals involved in sex work 
does not have a broader negative impact on the agency of women and 
girls in society.”131 
The tension points, in a nutshell, the disagreement among femi-
nists centers on agency and victimization. Radical feminists view all 
prostitution as sex trafficking and violence against women, regardless 
of consent.132 Within the radical feminist group, we find differences in 
what to do about prostitution, with some believing in harsh penalties 
even for the women involved because they have chosen to engage in 
criminal behavior.133 They hope that continuing to impose criminal pen-
alties on those who engage in sex work will deter others from following 
that path.134 Others, on the other hand, prefer to treat the women who 
sell sex as victims and to support them to change their path.135 
Liberal feminists recognize an individual’s right to choose sex 
work, but also acknowledge that sex workers can be victimized—by 
 
125 See Nichols, supra note 95, at 25–26. 
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their clients, those who manage them, the police, and the criminal justice 
system.136 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CRIMINALIZING SEX 
WORK  
We do not realize how large a part of our law is open to 
reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the 
public mind.137 
The concept of a woman’s right to make decisions about her 
body and an individual’s right to make intimate decisions important to 
human dignity without state interference underpins many of the argu-
ments of those who want to decriminalize sex work. In Griswold v. Con-
necticut, the Supreme Court identified a right to privacy emanating from 
the specific guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights.138 At times the 
right to privacy is found in the penumbra of the First Amendment;139 at 
other times the right to privacy is part of the liberty interest found in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.140  
As recently as 2003, when the Supreme Court addressed homo-
sexual sodomy, it recognized that the fundamental right to liberty “pre-
sumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, ex-
pression, and certain intimate conduct.”141 This liberty interest includes 
the right of a woman to make “certain fundamental decisions affecting 
her destiny.”142 While the Court has specifically identified several fun-
damental privacy rights,143  it has also noted that “personal privacy 
 
136 See Nichols, supra note 95, at 62–63. 
137 Oliver Wendall Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). 
138 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
139 Id. at 483 (“[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from gov-
ernmental intrusion. In like context, we have protected forms of ‘association’ that are not polit-
ical in the customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the mem-
bers.”). 
140 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
141 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
142 Id. at 565.  
143 Fundamental privacy rights identified by the U.S. Supreme Court include the right to same-
sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015); the right to engage in private, 
consensual sodomy, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562; a woman’s right, under certain conditions, to 
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includes the interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions . . . [but] the outer limits of this aspect of privacy has 
not been marked by the Court.”144 If the limits of the fundamental right 
to privacy are unknown, it is reasonable to ask whether the right to de-
termine whether and under what conditions one engages in sexual ac-
tivity falls within those boundaries. 
A. Does a fundamental right to engage in sex work exist?   
The criminalization of commercial sex work may have seemed 
appropriate when people believed legitimate concerns about health risks 
to the public existed, crime increased because of sex work, and when 
other forms of non-marital sex were also illegal. But, evidence demon-
strates that the health and safety concerns to the public are unrelated to 
commercial sex work, and other forms of non-marital sex like adultery, 
fornication, and sodomy have been decriminalized.145 Consequently, the 
fundamental right to make decisions about intimate associations, that is 
who one has sex with and under what conditions, is now manifested. 
Continuing to criminalize an individual’s choice to exchange sex for 
money violates our constitutional protection of individual liberty. 
To those who want to criminalize sex work, sexual intimacy is 
meant for marriage or committed relationships.146 Those with more sex-
positive beliefs who still don’t approve of commercial sex work often 
believe commercializing sex demeans those who engage in this activity 
and the intimate act of sex itself.147 People are entitled to these beliefs.  
But just because the majority may believe in a critical difference be-
tween sex where no money exchanges hands and sex where the ex-
change of money occurs, does not mean that the latter should be prohib-
ited. If the majority of people in the country believed that all forms of 
contraception were wrong, that would not justify prohibiting those who 
held different beliefs from having access to contraceptive methods. 
The criminalization of commercial sex is similar to the criminal-
ization of homosexuality. Both have been treated differently by the 
criminal law over time. As Justice Kennedy noted in Obergefell v. 
 
terminate a pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); the right of individuals to make 
decisions regarding whether or not to have children, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972); the right to interracial marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); the right to  
marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut., 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965); and the right to pro-
creation, Skinner v. Oklahoma., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
144 Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (internal citations omitted). 
145 See infra Part IV.B. 
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Hodges, “[u]ntil the mid-20th century, same sex intimacy long had been 
condemned as immoral by the state itself in most Western nations, a 
belief often embodied in the criminal law.”148 Justice Kennedy contin-
ued, noting: 
Th[e] Court first gave detailed consideration to the legal 
status of homosexuals in Bowers v. Hardwick. There it 
upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia law deemed to 
criminalize certain homosexual acts. Ten years later, in 
Romer v. Evans the Court invalidated an amendment to 
Colorado’s Constitution that sought to foreclose any 
branch or political subdivision of the State from protect-
ing persons against discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation. Then, in 2003 [in Lawrence v. Texas], the Court 
overruled Bowers, holding that laws making same-sex 
intimacy a crime ‘demea[n] the lives of homosexual per-
sons.’149 
Similarly, criminal law has treated prostitution differently over 
time. Instead of a long history of being criminalized, prostitution has a 
long history of being tolerated without criminal penalties. Once crimi-
nalized, like the legal status of homosexuals under Bowers, when it was 
controlling, prostitutes have seen an erosion of the laws surrounding re-
strictions on similar types of behavior.150 If laws that make same-sex 
intimacy a crime demean the lives of homosexual persons, then laws 
that make the exchange of sex for money demean the lives of prostitutes.  
B. Criminalizing the exchange of sex for money violates 
constitutional rights to liberty and privacy. 
The United States constitution protects personal liberty.151 
“[T]here is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not 
enter,”152 and that realm includes decisions about consensual sexual 
 
148 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 660 (2015); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
149 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 661–62 (citations omitted). 
150 Criminal laws relating to sodomy, fornication, and adultery have either been repealed or are 
no longer enforced. 
151 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV §1. 
152 Casey, 505 U.S. at 847. 
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activity.153 The Constitution has no express provision guaranteeing a 
person’s right to conduct his or her life protected by a zone of privacy. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the penumbras of the specific guar-
antees found in the Bill of Rights creates such a zone of privacy.154 
Though the Court has named some liberty interests, there are other un-
enumerated, fundamental, substantive rights and interests.155 
The expansion of privacy rights does not happen easily. To es-
tablish a previously unrecognized fundamental privacy right one must 
expect to take a case through the entire court system and hope that the 
Supreme Court will consider the case. Though the recognition of addi-
tional privacy rights should not be made hastily, lower courts should 
refrain from reading the cases that have enumerated fundamental liberty 
or privacy rights as imposing hard limits on the potential privacy rights 
that have not been imposed by the Supreme Court. But, exactly that has 
happened, creating a line of cases that appear to rely on analysis that 
interprets Supreme Court precedent even more strictly than the Court 
itself has indicated should occur.  
C. The commercial nature of sex work 
Decisions in many state courts appear to impose restrictions on 
the right to privacy that are not supported by existing precedent. One 
aspect of sex work continues to be used to distinguish it from other de-
cisions about sexual activity. At times this is described as the commer-
cial nature of the sexual interaction. At other times, the emphasis is on 
the public interaction involved in negotiating the terms of the sexual 
interaction. However, no basis exists for concluding that the exchange 
of money for sexual activity eliminates the fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Several state cases rely on Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton156 for 
the proposition that privacy rights do not extend to interactions with a 
commercial nature, such as prostitution. These cases assert that the ex-
change of money for sexual activity makes the action commercial, and 
 
153 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (acknowledging “an emerging awareness that 
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex”). 
154 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The specific provisions of the Bill of Rights 
that created zones of privacy were the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.  
155 See Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977). The Carey Court iden-
tified examples of cases identifying fundamental rights not mentioned specifically in the Bill of 
Rights, including “marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing 
and education.” Id. (citations omitted). 
156 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
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that characterization makes it impossible to fall within the constitutional 
protections afforded to liberty interests.157 For instance, in Lutz v. 
United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found there 
was “no fundamental right for commercial sexual solicitation.”158 The 
Lutz court asserted that “although the Supreme Court has recognized 
that the constitutional right to privacy for certain intimate conduct ex-
tends beyond the home to a hotel room, this right does not extend to 
protection for commercial sexual solicitation.”159  The court continued 
to distinguish commercial sex from those relationships previously iden-
tified as protected liberty interests, relying on Paris Adult Theatre I.160 
The examples of already-recognized privacy interests the Lutz Court 
cited included marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child-rearing, and education.161 The Court completed this com-
parison by suggesting that the fundamental personal right of a woman 
to choose whether to “bear or beget a child” should not extend to selling 
“the use of one’s body for sexual purposes.”162 The Lutz Court’s reliance 
on Paris Adult Theatre I to support its assertion that the commercial 
nature removes prostitution from the constitutionally-protected sphere 
is misplaced.  
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton reviewed a decision of the Geor-
gia Supreme Court that held the sale and delivery of obscene material 
to willing adults was not protected by the First Amendment.163 Though 
the Court remanded the case for further evaluation in light of its deci-
sion, it also held that there was no constitutional prohibition that pre-
vented the state of Georgia from restricting materials considered ob-
scene from being shown in an adult theater.164 
When considering the potential constitutional protection, the 
Court reminded us that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not 
protect obscenity.165 Additionally, the Court reinforced its position that 
states have a legitimate interest in regulating obscenity when it circu-
lates in commerce and appears in places of public accommodation.166 It 
rejected the argument that regulation of obscenity made available only 
to consenting adults brought the obscenity within the material protected 
 
157 Id.; Lutz v. United States, 434 A.2d 442, 445–46 (D.C. 1981). 




162 Id. at 446. 
163 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 53 (1973). 
164 Id. at 70. 
165 Id. at 54. 
166 Id. at 57. 
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from regulation.167 In doing so, the Court referred to the obscenity at 
issue as “commercialized obscenity”168 apparently to distinguish ob-
scenity available in places of public accommodation such as theaters 
from obscenity viewed in the privacy of one’s home. The latter situation 
is entitled to protection from state interference,169 but commercial ven-
tures such as a theater are not private and therefore are subject to state 
regulation.170 
The commercial aspect of the Court’s analysis related to where 
the obscenity was being viewed, not the fact that those viewing it had 
paid to do so. In fact, as the Court reviewed its Fourteenth Amendment 
right to privacy decisions it noted that “[n]othing  . . . in [the] Court’s 
decisions intimates that there is any ‘fundamental’ privacy right ‘im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ to watch obscene movies in 
places of public accommodation.”171 
The other part of the Paris Adult Theater I case that touches on 
the commercial aspect of viewing obscenity involved the argument that 
by restricting the viewing to consenting adults the obscene material was 
not subject to state regulation.172 Rejecting this argument, the Court 
stated: 
Commercial exploitation of depictions, descriptions, or 
exhibitions of obscene conduct on commercial premises 
open to the adult public falls within a State’s broad 
power to regulate commerce and protect the public envi-
ronment. . . . The States have the power to make a mor-
ally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene 
material, or commerce in such material has a tendency to 
injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public 
safety or to jeopardize . . . the States’ ‘right . . . to main-
tain a decent society.’173 
It is important to recognize that the Paris Adult Theatre I Court 
was addressing an activity that had already been identified as beyond 
the protection afforded fundamental rights. It was attempting to deter-
mine whether the location—a publicly available theater—meant the 
 
167 Id. Individuals have the right to view obscene materials in the privacy of their home without 
interference from the state. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).  
168 Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 57. 
169 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. 
170 Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 65. 
171 Id. at 66 (citation omitted). 
172 Id. at 68 (citation omitted). 
173 Id. at 68–69. 
ANDERSON 
2021] ENDING THE WAR AGAINST SEX WORK 97 
obscenity in that specific location became protected because it had sim-
ilarities to the viewing of obscenity in a private home, an activity pro-
tected because of its location.174 Nothing in the Court’s discussion fo-
cused on the exchange of money being important to the commercial 
nature of the case. The public accommodation aspect brought the view-
ing into the commercial realm. 
The Lutz court focused on the commercial nature of the activity 
under review.175 But the Lutz court did not consider the connection be-
tween the fundamental rights related to sexual intimacy and its conse-
quences and the right to make decisions about one’s body. The activity 
in Paris Adult Theatre I  did not involve personal decisions relating to 
sexual intimacy, so the Court could not address how that intimacy and 
its consequences were connected to the right to make decisions about 
one’s body. Yet, ignoring that part of the issue, the Lutz court relied on 
Paris and the commercial nature of both activities to exclude commer-
cial sexual activity from protection.176 
D. Liberty and privacy interests in decisions about private, 
consensual sexual activity 
The Constitution limits the ability of the government to compel, 
forbid, or regulate intimate details of private, consensual behavior be-
tween adults.177 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court stated that 
there is a fundamental right to liberty “that presumes an autonomy of 
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain in-
timate conduct.”178 Found under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, this liberty interest includes the right of a woman to 
make “certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny.”179 Regulat-
ing private decisions related to sexual activity violates an individual’s 
right to be free from unwarranted intrusion into decisions core to a per-
son’s identity.180 Whether and how one engages with another sexually 
is such a profound attribute of personhood that government interference 
is repugnant to human dignity and the liberty interest protected by our 
 
174 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 50 (1973). 
175 Lutz v. United States, 434 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C. 1981). 
176 Id. 
177 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
178 Id. at 562. 
179 Id. at 565 (referencing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
180 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down a criminal law that 
forced couples to accept the risk of pregnancy when engaging in sexual intercourse by prohib-
iting access to contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing the 
right of individuals to be free from government intrusion in decisions related to sex). 
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constitution. Like the freedom to make decisions about preventing or 
terminating a pregnancy, the decision about under what conditions one 
will engage in sexual activity with another consenting adult is a decision 
central to personal dignity and autonomy and the liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.181 
E. Liberty interest in bodily integrity 
As the Court noted when addressing the right to make decisions 
about abortions in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, “[i]t is settled now . . . 
that the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a 
person’s most basic decisions about . . . bodily integrity.”182 Likewise, 
in his concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg, Justice Souter pointed 
out that one’s liberty interest in bodily integrity generally means that 
competent adults have “a right to determine what shall be done with his 
own body.”183 
In Washington v. Glucksberg the Supreme Court considered 
whether a fundamental right to assisted suicide exists.184 The Court out-
lined a two-step process for analyzing due process liberty interests.185 
The first step requires looking to the “Nation’s history, legal traditions, 
and practices.”186 The second step requires the court to use a “careful 
description of the asserted fundamental interest.”187 
Implementing the first step of the analysis, the Glucksberg Court 
looked back more than 700 years to consider how suicide and assisting 
suicide have been treated.188 After conducting that review the Court 
found opposition to suicide consistent and enduring.189 After noting that 
the specific interest being considered was whether there was a constitu-
tionally protected liberty right to commit suicide, including to have as-
sistance in doing so,190 the Court ultimately found no fundamental right 
to suicide, so it applied a rational basis review to find the legislation 
under consideration constitutional.191 
 
181 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  
182 Id. at 849. 
183 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
184 Id. at 702. 
185 Id. at 703. 
186 Id. at 710. 
187 Id. at 721. 
188 Id. at 711. 
189 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711. 
190 Id. at 723. 
191 Id. at 728. 
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Though Glucksberg did not include suicide and assisted suicide 
in the group of fundamental rights, the Court relied heavily on another 
case that involved decisions over one’s body, Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health.192 Characterizing Cruzan not as a case 
about the right to die as it is often referred to, but as a case about the 
right to “refuse life saving hydration and nutrition,”193 the Court noted 
that the decision in Cruzan was appropriate because it followed the con-
cepts of personal autonomy and a long history of forced medication be-
ing considered battery.194 
Control over one’s body is essential in matters relating to sexual 
activity. In fact, that control over what happens to one’s body when en-
gaging in or deciding not to engage in sexual activity is the bedrock 
concept of consent.195 How someone chooses to use his or her body in 
connection with consensual sexual activity is as personal a decision as 
whether to prevent or terminate a pregnancy, whether to allow doctors 
to perform medical procedures, or whether to end one’s own life. By 
criminalizing an individual’s choice to engage in private, consensual 
sexual activity in exchange for money, the state invades that individ-
ual’s liberty interest in bodily integrity by dictating and limiting the con-
ditions under which one can engage in sexual activity. 
The liberty interest at stake here is not whether one has a pro-
tected interest in exchanging sex for money. It is the fundamental inter-
est in decisions about consensual sexual activity, with the details of what 
those decisions look like left to the participants. If two adults have the 
protected right to determine whether they engage in oral or anal sex, 
these same adults should have the right to decide whether one will pro-
vide the other with money or something of value as part of their agree-
ment to engage in sexual activity. If the exchange of a dinner date for 
sex would be protected, the exchange of money for sex should be simi-
larly protected. The Due Process Clause does not distinguish among 
classes of citizens, shielding the choices of some over others.196 Swing-
ers who choose to engage in recreational sex with people they just met 
and may never know by their real name are no different from sex work-
ers who choose to engage in sex with people they just met. The fact that 
a swinger gets an adrenaline rush and the sex worker gets cash should 
 
192 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  
193 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723; see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. 
194 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725. 
195 For an interesting discussion of the way consent creates tension between rape and prostitu-
tion see Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988). 
196 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
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not change the protection afforded their liberty interest in making those 
choices without state interference or criminal penalty. 
Legal change moves at a snail’s pace. When determining 
whether to recognize a choice as a fundamental liberty interest the Court 
looks beyond historical precedent to the way the activity at issue has 
been treated over time.197 
When the Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick it relied 
on long-standing prohibitions against sodomy.198 When the Lawrence 
Court overturned this decision, it recognized that most decisions about 
individual sexual activity involve more than just the conduct involved; 
they are about individual identity.199 The Court also noted that there was 
no long-standing prohibition against homosexual conduct specifically, 
but instead, those long-standing roots’ were related to non-procreative 
sex.200 Further, the Court noted that criminal prohibition of homosexual 
sodomy only developed in the latter part of the twentieth century.201 
The laws criminalizing sex work are twentieth-century enact-
ments. Like the sodomy statutes addressed in Bowers, and then recon-
sidered and found unconstitutional in Lawrence, criminal prohibitions 
against sex work were enacted to prohibit non-procreational sex in gen-
eral, along the same lines as laws prohibiting fornication, adultery, ac-
cess to birth control, and abortion.202 As becomes evident from the re-
peal of most of these laws, and the lack of prosecution of those that may 
remain on the books, the “ancient roots” argument does not hold water. 
The same is true of criminal prohibitions of sex work. 
Looking at relevant legal traditions and practices, it becomes 
clear that protected liberty interests extend beyond those explicitly rec-
ognized when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.203 Traditionally, 
prostitution was not criminalized. In fact, it was an important part of the 
way society operated. Women who were expected to marry were also 
expected to be chaste; men were expected to be sexually experienced.204 
Prostitutes filled the gap. Women of the marrying type were thought to 
 
197 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–19. 
198 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003)). 
199 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
200 Id. at 568–69. 
201 Id. at 570. 
202 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. 
203 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992). 
204 Kathryn Hughes, Gender roles in the 19th century, BRITISH LIBRARY, https://www.bl.uk/ro-
mantics-and-victorians/articles/gender-roles-in-the-19th-century#. 
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be disinterested in sex, yet men were expected to have healthy sexual 
appetites. Prostitutes filled the gap..205 
If sodomy is no longer criminalized, prostitution should not be 
either. The criminalization of all forms of sodomy—heterosexual or ho-
mosexual—has a longer legal tradition than other forms of sexual activ-
ity, dating as far back as Plato’s Laws.206 At the time the Bill of Rights 
was ratified in 1791, all thirteen states outlawed sodomy by criminal 
statute.207 The tradition of making sodomy a criminal offense continued 
in all fifty states for many years, though by 1986, there remained only 
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia that continued to have 
sodomy prohibitions in their statutes.208 
As noted earlier,209 similar to the twenty-first-century criminal-
ization of homosexuality, prostitution did not become criminalized until 
the beginning of the twentieth century. At the time, other behaviors as-
sociated with sexual activity were also prohibited through criminal stat-
utes.210 Except for prostitution, the criminal penalties for other forms of 
sexual activity such as adultery, sodomy, and fornication have either 
been eliminated or are no longer enforced in any meaningful way.211 
The unmistakable trend is to remove government intrusion into deci-
sions about consensual sex among adults. 
 
205 Id. 
206 Yao Apasu-Gbotsu, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homo-
sexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986).  
207 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193–94, 192 n.5 (1986) (overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
208 Apasu-Gbotsu, supra note 208, at 524.  
209 See supra Part II. 
210 PLILEY, supra note 2, at 67 (discussing state laws that prohibited acts such as promiscuity). 
211 Examples of the repeal of laws relating to sodomy include: 1993 Nev. Stat. ch. 236 (repeal-
ing NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.193); 2001 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 382 (West) (repealing ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412); 1998 R.I. Pub. Laws 24 (amending R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 to exclude 
conduct with other persons). For a description of the history of sodomy prohibitions, see Brief 
of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003). As of this writing, only sixteen states have statutes criminalizing adultery. Alabama, 
ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2020); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2020); Florida, FLA. 
STAT. § 798.01 (2020); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-19 (2020); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-
6601 (2020); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-35 (2020); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5511 (2020); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.30 (2020); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 609.36 
(2020); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (Jan 11, 2021); New York, N.Y. PENAL CODE 
§ 255.30 (McKinney 2020); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (2019); Oklahoma, 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 871 (2020); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2020); Virginia, 
VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-365 (2020); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 944.16 (2021). Fornication statutes 
remain in only four states: Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (2020); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/11-40 (2020); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (Jan. 11, 2021); and South Carolina, 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2020). 
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While sodomy has been illegal throughout much of recorded his-
tory, prostitution is considered “the world’s oldest profession.”212 Un-
regulated and accepted for centuries before being caught up in the rela-
tively short-term and unsuccessful temperance efforts, prostitution 
could be decriminalized without breaking with long-standing legal tra-
dition. As we will see in Part IV,213 any secular reasons to criminalize a 
person’s decision about whether to accept money for sexual activity 
have been repudiated, and no long-standing legal history of making such 
a choice a criminal act exists. Consequently, the only potential justifi-
cations for criminalizing exchanging sexual activity for money are reli-
gious and moral objections. Those objections are not sufficient to in-
fringe upon an individual’s liberty interest. Like those who hold 
religious objections to the recognition of the right of same-sex couples 
to marry, who “may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere convic-
tion that, by divine precepts same-sex marriage should not be con-
doned,”214 those who object to the decriminalization of sex work can 
continue to advocate in line with their convictions. But just as objections 
to same-sex marriage cannot justify infringing on individual rights,215 
similar convictions about sex work should not justify infringing on an 
individual’s liberty interest to make decisions about consensual sexual 
behavior. 
F. Sex work and the right to privacy 
The statutes at issue in Lawrence only prohibited a particular sex 
act,216 but because they involved personal choices about sexual behav-
ior, they touched a personal relationship that falls within a person’s lib-
erty to choose. According to the Court, the state and courts should re-
frain from setting boundaries about this relationship when it causes no 
harm to a person or institution protected by law.217 
 
212 Though this phrase is thought to have been coined by Rudyard Kipling, the fact is, prostitu-
tion has been around in some form or another throughout history. Humans have exchanged sex 
for money or things of value for as long as history has documented. See generally Forrest Wick-
man, Is Prostitution Really the World’s Oldest Profession?, SLATE (Mar. 6, 2012, 5:57 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/03/rush-limbaugh-calls-sandra-fluke-a-prostitute-is-
prostitution-really-the-worlds-oldest-profession.html.   
213 See infra Part IV. 
214 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 679 (2015). 
215 Id. at 680. 
216 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (discussing Texas statute which made it a 
crime for two individuals of the same sex to partake in intimate sexual conduct was unconstitu-
tional “as applied to adult males who had engaged in consensual act of sodomy in privacy of 
home”). 
217 Id.    
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Looking back at the way Bowers supported the criminal statutes 
later found unconstitutional in Lawrence, it becomes clear that the Court 
at that time believed it appropriate to use legislation to enforce moral 
objections to homosexuality.218 These moral beliefs were shaped by re-
ligion and traditional ideas about family. However, the position of the 
Court has changed. Majority opinion about morality can no longer be 
enforced through criminal law or state action.219 Instead, “[the Court’s] 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral 
code.”220 Instead, protecting liberty rights includes protecting adults’ 
ability to make their own decisions about how they conduct their sexual 
lives.221 Intimate decisions about one’s physical relationships are part of 
the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.222 
Lawrence, and other decisions involving analysis of fundamen-
tal rights that the majority of society might consider immoral, such as 
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton223 and Romer v. Evans,224 make clear 
that each time the Court considers a potential fundamental right claim, 
it addresses only the specific facts of the case. These cases do so by 
elaborating on other factual situations not found before the Court.225 
 
218 Id. at 567 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)) (“The Bowers 
Court was . . . making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to 
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral, but this Court’s obligation is to define the liberty of 
all, not to mandate its own moral code.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled 
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
219 Thomas L. Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern Doc-
trine of Substantive Due Process, 126 U. PENN. L. REV., 344, 344–45 (1977); see also Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code.”).   
220 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992)). 
221 Id. at 572. (“These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining 
to sex.”). 
222 Id. at 559, 577 (reaffirming Justice Stevens’ dissent from Bowers that “the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice”). 
223 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (addressing public showing of obscene 
movies). 
224 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (addressing discrimination against homosexual indi-
viduals). 
225 Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69 (pointing out that the Court’s holding was directed 
“not at thoughts or speech, but at depiction and description of specifically defined sexual con-
duct”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (identifying several laws that disadvantaged specific groups but 
were upheld because there was a rational basis); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The 
present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or co-
erced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not 
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”). 
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Statements identifying factual situations that are not justiciable based 
on the facts present in the cases before the Court do not mean the Court 
would refuse to recognize a fundamental liberty interest in the non-jus-
ticiable facts. The references to alternative situations point out facts and 
issues not ripe for review in the case being decided because no party 
with standing to bring the issue to the Court is a party.226 As noted ear-
lier in this section, several cases addressing criminal statutes prohibiting 
prostitution have mischaracterized the Supreme Court’s dicta as holding 
by misinterpreting the purpose of the Court mentioning related issues 
not under review.   
G. The Effect of Lawrence v. Texas  
The simple fact that an activity is commercial does not eliminate 
the possibility that it can be protected by the constitution.227 In Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.,228 the Court addressed a different fundamental right—the First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech—and held that just because 
speech was commercial did not take it out of the realm of protected 
speech.229 In support of its decision, the Court referenced the fact that it 
had held commercial speech that involved content about a protected 
subject—abortion—could also not be restricted just because of its com-
mercial nature.230 
Whether engaging in sexual activity for money is a protected 
right depends on how one interprets Lawrence. Unfortunately, the exact 
nature of the right protected in Lawrence is unclear. The Court ad-
dressed specific facts yet used broad language about privacy and choice 
to engage in sexual intimacy.231 Consequently, it is difficult to deter-
mine how far Lawrence extends. That the Lawrence holding extends 
beyond its specific facts is evident from the Court’s use of that holding 
when determining that same-sex couples have the same rights as 
 
226 See generally Russell W. Galloway, Basic Justiciability Analysis, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
911, 918 (1990). 
227 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
228 Id. at 761–62. 
229 Id. at 770. 
230 Id. at 759–60 (describing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)). 
231 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 595 (2003) (stating that “Eisenstadt contains well-
known dictum relating to the ‘right to privacy,’ but this referred to the right recognized in Gris-
wold—a right penumbral to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, and not a ‘substantive 
due process’ right” and that “there has been no showing that in this country the governmental 
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent”).  
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opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association in Obergefell.232 
However, it is unclear whether this right extends to all forms of sexual 
activity among consenting adults. 
Additionally, the type of scrutiny the Lawrence Court applied to 
reach its decision concerning Due Process lacks clarity. If there is a fun-
damental liberty interest in engaging in consensual sexual activity re-
gardless of the exchange of money, restrictions on this behavior must 
survive the high standard of strict scrutiny. If no fundamental liberty 
interest exists, prohibitions are subject to the rational basis standard of 
review.233 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals examined a Cali-
fornia criminal statute prohibiting prostitution.234 The Court determined 
that Lawrence was not relevant to its determination, stating: 
As we have observed before, “the bounds of Lawrence’s 
holding are unclear.” The nature of the right Lawrence 
protects—be it a right to private sexual activity among 
consenting adults, or the right to achieve a “‘personal 
bond more enduring’” by the use of private sexual con-
duct—never stated explicitly in the opinion and has not 
been elaborated upon by the Supreme Court since. But 
whatever the nature of the right protected in Lawrence, 
one thing Lawrence does make explicit is that the Law-
rence case “does not involve . . . prostitution.”235 
Ignoring the Supreme Court’s elaboration of Lawrence in Ober-
gefell, the Ninth Circuit went on to apply Ninth Circuit precedents to 
rule that laws prohibiting prostitution were subject to rational basis re-
view.236 
The Ninth Circuit and several other courts correctly point out 
that Lawrence did not address prostitution.237 The Supreme Court could 
 
232 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015). 
233 Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Research Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 450, 455 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
234 See id.  
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not do so, because it did not have the appropriate facts. In addition to 
avoiding a decision about prostitution, the Lawrence Court also noted 
that it was not addressing issues related to minors, coerced sex, or public 
sex.238 But, Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that other laws relating to 
sexual activity, including those related to prostitution, “are  . . . sustain-
able only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral 
choices”239 and those laws were now questionable after Lawrence. Ex-
pressing his indignation with the majority position, Scalia reminds us 
that the majority recognized “an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”240 
Justice Scalia was right to point this out. The majority opinion 
not only recognized this understanding that adults’ decisions regarding 
sex should be protected, but it also noted that the 1955 Model Penal 
Code specifically “did not recommend or provide for ‘criminal penalties 
for consensual sexual relations conducted in private.’”241 Justification 
provided in the comments to the Model Penal Code noted that penaliz-
ing conduct in which people commonly engaged undermined respect for 
the law; consensual, private sex was not harmful to others; and, laws 
that criminalized these behaviors were not enforced, which could lead 
to the use of the law for threatening purposes.242 
Assuming that Lawrence and Obergefell establish a fundamental 
right to privacy in all consensual sexual conduct between adults, strict 
scrutiny would apply to statutes prohibiting sexual activity between 
consenting adults that involves the exchange of money. The additional 
factor of this prohibition applying most frequently to women and the 
choices they make about what they do with or allow to be done to their 
bodies also argues for the application of strict scrutiny.  
IV. PURPORTED STATE INTERESTS TO SUPPORT 
CRIMINALIZATION 
Strict scrutiny requires that the state provide a compelling gov-
ernment interest to support the challenged action and demonstrate that 
the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result.243 If strict 
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scrutiny is not appropriate, a rational basis must still exist for the crim-
inal legislation.244 
When challenged, states have identified several potential justifi-
cations for prohibiting prostitution.245 None identify compelling inter-
ests. Additionally, state action criminalizing prostitution is not narrowly 
tailored to address those purported interests. 
Five broad concerns are often identified as justification for crim-
inalizing prostitution:  
1. Prostitution causes an increase in crime; 
2. Prostitution jeopardizes public health by increasing 
the transmission of sexually transmitted infections; 
3. Prostitution commodifies and objectifies sex work-
ers; 
4. Prostitution exploits and oppresses sex workers and 
is equivalent to sex trafficking; and 
5. Prostitution is hostile to religious values and tradi-
tional family integrity.246 
More specific justifications for criminalizing prostitution follow 
similar themes as those noted above. They may be examples of the more 
broadly stated concerns, but they are distinct enough to deserve specific 
mention. The link between prostitution and trafficking247 is a more pre-
cise way of articulating a concern about the exploitation and oppression 
of innocent women and girls.  
Within the broad category of increased crime are concerns about 
prostitution increasing violence against women because prostitutes 
might be more likely to depend on those involved in organized crime.248 
Also, a subset of the increased crime concern is the link between pros-
titution and drug use.249 Each of these justifications has been shown to 
be specious at best. 
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A. Criminal activity 
Connections between prostitution and crime exist, but prostitu-
tion does not necessarily cause crime. Prostitution is more prevalent in 
areas with higher crime because those who engage in street-based pros-
titution may also have substance-abuse issues, which requires that they 
locate themselves in areas where drugs are sold.250 What is more likely 
than prostitution causing increased crime is the easy access to drugs in 
a high-crime neighborhood makes it a convenient location for sex work-
ers who have drug habits to conduct their transactions. There is no direct 
cause-and-effect relationship between prostitution and an increase in 
neighborhood crime.251 
Because prostitution is criminalized, those who engage in this 
activity must avoid detection and interaction with the police. One effec-
tive way to do so is to accept the protection of those involved in orga-
nized crime or others who engage in criminal activity.252 This requires 
operating in areas where crime exists, and this leads to those engaged in 
prostitution becoming the victims of violence and crime. No one dis-
putes that women who engage in prostitution are subject to violence. 
Twenty years ago, Sylvia Law reported the prevalence of violence suf-
fered by women engaged in prostitution thusly: 
Many studies of women who work the street report that 
eighty percent have been physically assaulted during the 
course of their work. Women who provide commercial 
sex are often the victims of rape. They are murdered, per-
haps at a rate forty times the national average. Police sys-
tematically ignore commercial sex workers’ complaints 
about violence and fail to investigate even murder. In-
deed, police officers rape and beat sex workers, and are 
rarely prosecuted for their wrongdoing. Customers, 
pimps, police and other men inflict these harms on 
women.253  
But is it prostitution that brings crime and violence? Do those 
who engage in sex work also want to be part of the criminal element that 
appears to be attributed to them? Those of us who conduct research and 
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engage in advocacy about sex work often get criticized by sex workers 
for not listening to them and for not engaging them in the discussion. 
Whether prostitution causes crime or whether sex workers become vic-
tims of crime because their work is criminalized is an area where sex 
workers have spoken out. 
As Sylvia Law pointed out, many sex workers are the victims of 
violence.254 And they become involved with the criminal element to 
have some protection. However, they also quickly point out that decrim-
inalizing sex work would alleviate much of the concern about crime and 
violence. 
According to Hacking/Hustling, a group consisting of sex work-
ers and sex worker allies, having the ability to negotiate with clients 
without the pressure and fear of arrest as they negotiate would make 
interactions with clients safer.255 By managing client expectations re-
garding price and services they can minimize the chance of a violent 
encounter because of misunderstandings about price or expected ser-
vice.256 Decriminalization would allow sex workers to return to online 
communication, negotiation, and screening practices, reducing the risk 
of violence and reducing the need for the protection of a pimp.257 The 
ability to operate independently means sex workers would not need to 
rely on others who are often involved in criminal activity, for protection 
or to generate business. Until recently, sex workers had found safety by 
using online platforms. As noted by Hacking/Hustling “[w]hen 
Craigslist Erotic Services opened, a 17% reduction in all female homi-
cide was reported in the following years.”258 The change in the ability 
to work with the protection of online platforms allows us to compare the 
relative safety before and after the additional barriers to safer sex work 
were put in place. 
Using their intimate connection to the sex worker community, 
Hacking/Hustling documented a 33.8% increase in violence from cli-
ents259 and a return to working under the control and protection of a 
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pimp.260 In addition to violence from clients, sex workers often face vi-
olence from police officers, ranging from threats and harassment to 
rape.261   
Sex workers recognize that much of the violence they endure 
stems from the criminal nature of their work.262 Decriminalizing sex 
work would allow those engaged in the work to more easily report vio-
lence and exploitation.263 Sex work does not cause increased crime or 
violence against women. It is a symptom of the result of criminalizing 
prostitution. There is no legitimate support for the state using increased 
crime or violence as a justification for criminalizing prostitution. 
B. Public health concerns 
One of the reasons most often advanced for the criminalization 
of prostitution is the prevention of disease, and more specifically, pre-
venting the spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV.264 
In the commentary to the Model Penal Code, the American Law Insti-
tute noted that the “perceived relationship between prostitution and ve-
nereal disease” was of special importance in the decision to maintain the 
criminal prohibitions against prostitution.265 The comment continues by 
explaining that the way STIs are transmitted and detected makes testing 
an ineffective method of preventing the spread of disease by an infected 
individual who engages in sexual activity with numerous people every 
day.266 It ends the comment about the spread of disease by relying on 
data from World War II as support for the implication that prostitutes 
increase the prevalence of sexually transmitted disease.267 
Citing to information from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), courts identify preventing the spread of disease as a 
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legitimate concern of the state.268 Those courts and advocates relying on 
the CDC report to suggest criminalizing prostitution may somehow de-
crease the prevalence of STIs and HIV fail to point out that the report 
itself acknowledges that its conclusions are not based on actual data. 
The report specifically notes that there have been “[f]ew large-scale 
(population-based) studies . . . on HIV among [those who exchange sex 
for money or other items of value].”269 It asserts, with no data to support 
such assertion, that “[p]ersons who exchange sex are at increased risk 
of getting or transmitting HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs) because they are more likely to engage in risky sexual behaviors 
(e.g. sex without a condom, sex with multiple partners) and substance 
abuse.”270 However, in the very next section, under the heading “Lack 
of Data,” the report specifically acknowledges its lack of data and the 
resulting barriers to prevention efforts.271 
The report continues to identify socioeconomic factors, sexual 
risk factors, drug and alcohol use, and knowledge of HIV status as po-
tential risk factors for HIV and sexually transmitted diseases.272 Yet on 
each of these sections, the report makes assumptions with no underlying 
support: Sex workers “may have a history of homelessness . . . if under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, may have impaired judgment, engage 
in riskier forms of sex such as anal sex . . . may not know their HIV 
status . . .”273 It seems that these concerns could be connected to anyone, 
whether they engage in sex work or not. 
However, when we look at a report that relies on actual, recent 
data, we see that it suggests that decriminalization would promote pub-
lic health by eliminating the reasons that sex workers may present a 
higher risk for sexually transmitted diseases. According to Data for Pro-
gress: 
The criminalization of sex work interferes with efforts to 
prevent and treat HIV/AIDS and other health conditions 
in several ways. A Human Rights Watch report found 
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because prosecutors use condoms as evidence in prosti-
tution cases and police often harass and arrest people for 
carrying condoms, people in the sex trades are afraid of 
carrying condoms and health outreach workers are una-
ble to distribute condoms freely. Sex workers are also 
less able to negotiate condom usage or other safer sex 
practices with clients under criminalization because they 
must prioritize their immediate safety from arrest over 
possible infections. A Lancet study found that the de-
criminalization of sex work could avert 33-46% of new 
HIV/AIDS infections in the next decade. Criminalization 
also disrupts general healthcare access for people in the 
sex trades. Because of stigma and fears of “discrimina-
tion, lower quality of service, and legal consequences” 
many sex workers do not disclose that they are trading 
sex. Even adjusting other factors out, the pure isolation 
of hiding involvement in sex work from friends, family 
and community is independently associated with addi-
tional barriers to healthcare access. Disclosure can be 
critical to addressing and preventing violence and ex-
ploitation. A systematic review of 33 countries by the 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine found 
that sex workers are 3x more likely to experience sexual 
and physical violence in countries with criminalization 
policies (including the Nordic Model) as compared to de-
criminalization approaches. 
Decriminalization is also critical to addressing the over-
dose crisis. Some studies indicate the rate of sex trade 
participation is as high as 56% for women who inject 
opioids. Research has shown that the criminalization of 
sex work and law enforcement violence disrupt medica-
tion assisted treatment programs and outcomes for such 
communities.274 
C. Objectification and commodification of women 
Another objection to sex work arises from concerns that sex 
work transforms “sex into an impersonal encounter with no emotional 
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significance . . .”275 Those who espouse this concern believe this trans-
formation degrades all women, turning them into sexual objects to be 
bought and sold.276 The underlying premise necessary to support such a 
position is that sex without romantic love is immoral.277 
The weakness of this position is its need to be based on a certain 
belief about morality. As noted in earlier sections, enforcement of one 
group’s ideas of morality cannot serve as the basis for restricting indi-
vidual freedoms.278 Imposing one particular view of morality on all in-
dividuals violates basic tenets of human rights protections—that all hu-
mans have the capacity to make choices about their lives and how they 
choose to live those lives, regardless of whether others believe those 
choices are inappropriate.279 
The belief that impersonal, commercialized sex undertaken by 
some causes harm to all women and consequently means all women will 
be objectified as sex objects is a form of authoritarianism. The only dif-
ference between this and the patriarchal structures that some believe 
contribute to the commodification and objectification of women is the 
lack of emphasis on the gender of those imposing their beliefs and struc-
tures on others. One of the foundations of basic human rights—for all, 
not just women—is that humans have the right to be autonomous—to 
control their lives and bodies. 
D. Exploitation of women and girls 
As discussed earlier, a prominent reason for supporting the con-
tinued criminalization of prostitution is to protect women and girls from 
exploitation.280 No one disputes that some people engaged in sex 
work—regardless of gender—are exploited. But continued criminaliza-
tion does not prevent this exploitation. Criminalization likely increases 
the number of people exploited and prevents some from finding ways to 
stop the exploitation. 
To exploit means to take advantage of one who is vulnerable.281 
Opponents of sex work suggest that the activity exploits women, that it 
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somehow takes advantage of vulnerable women.282 But characterizing 
sex workers as people who are exploited ignores the fact that many sex 
workers begin doing this work because they are already part of disad-
vantaged groups and they make a conscious choice to engage in sex 
work. This characterization as people who are being exploited suggests 
that these individuals are somehow incapable of making decisions about 
their lives and their bodies.283  
In addition to the potential exploitation of women and girls by 
those who induce them into sex work through fraud, threats, or coercion, 
even individuals who voluntarily choose to engage in sex work are ex-
ploited as a direct result of the criminalization of their actions.284 Be-
cause sex work is illegal, but enforcement is ineffective, it is not uncom-
mon for law enforcement officers to “have sex with trafficking victims 
and then arrest them.”285 Undercover officers are not legally allowed to 
engage in sexual activity with those who they suspect work as prosti-
tutes before they make an arrest, yet many do despite the illegality.286  
Police officers themselves may use coercion, by threatening to arrest 
someone if they don’t provide sexual services to the officer.287 
Decriminalization can reduce exploitation by law enforcement 
and allow sex workers to report instances of exploitation, of themselves 
or others, without fear of their own arrest. 
E. Distinctions between “moral rights” and “public or private 
morality” 
Whether it is appropriate to use moral values as the basis for law 
is debatable.288 While there is strong support for legislation that ad-
dresses public morality, especially regarding restrictions on harm to oth-
ers, that support is less evident when the morality being codified in-
volves private morality, or virtues.289 
Private morality, related to virtuous behavior as judged by one’s 
religious beliefs, was governed by ecclesiastical courts until King Henry 
VII enlarged the royal authority, subsuming ecclesiastical courts into his 
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authority.290 Today our unified legal system imposes restrictions on in-
dividuals who may hold vastly different ideas about moral versus im-
moral behavior when those terms refer to virtues based on religious val-
ues.291 
Laws that regulate public morality, that prevent people from 
harming others, arguably have a connection to moral rights, meaning 
human rights. Prohibiting the killing or assault of another demonstrates 
the respect for all humans to be able to exercise their right to live life as 
they see fit. These types of laws respect basic human dignity. There is a 
stark difference between laws protecting human dignity and laws forc-
ing society’s majority view about virtuous behavior on everyone, re-
gardless of whether all espouse the same view about the virtuousness of 
the behavior.292 Some laws regulate private morality because of its po-
tential to harm others, but even these are marginally effective. In her 
analysis of the effectiveness of legislation criminalizing drugs and pros-
titution, Dean Michèle Alexandre points out that one of the conse-
quences of attempting to influence the morality of individual behaviors 
by heavily regulating or criminalizing the behavior is to subject individ-
uals to additional harm.293 By making certain activities illegal, those 
who engage in the activity flee underground where they become vulner-
able to violence, predators, and exploitation by those who purport to 
provide them protection.294 
When criminal laws are justified by public morality interests 
those laws are subject to careful consideration to ensure that the claim 
of morality is valid and not simply the imposition of the prevailing pub-
lic sentiment about the offending behavior. Many references to public 
morality are actually references to prevailing sentiment about values ra-
ther than moral rights. Though at one time courts appeared to accept 
public morality as a legitimate justification for legislation, none of these 
decisions were based exclusively on public morality.295 
Many cases continue to include the state’s ability to regulate 
public morality as a legitimate rationale for legislation, but enforcing 
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private morality rarely suffices to uphold legislative action.296 In fact, in 
Lawrence v. Texas,297 the Supreme Court explicitly embraced Justice 
Stevens’ statement in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick that “the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a partic-
ular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”298 
Attempts to enforce private morality—choices individuals make 
about whether to engage in behavior that does not harm others—attempt 
to enforce what some might consider virtuous behavior.299 But the prob-
lem with attempting to enforce virtuous behavior is that virtues and the 
resulting benefits of virtuous behavior require that individuals choose to 
behave virtuously rather than being forced to do so. The freedom to 
make such choices, either to behave in a manner generally considered 
virtuous or to behave in ways not considered virtuous, is one of the basic 
human rights to which everyone is entitled. Treating people with dignity 
and respect for their autonomy requires accepting the choices they make 
about whether to conform to others’ ideas about virtuous behavior.  Leg-
islation that attempts to enforce virtuous behavior that is likely to have 
a positive effect on others is legislation that regulates public morality. 
This legislation establishes duties to others, for instance, the duty to 
send children to school, or the duty to pay child support.300 
Law inherently reflects society’s views about morality, but the 
use of the term morality deserves careful scrutiny. Public morality rea-
sons for legislation, especially criminal legislation, are usually reasons 
based on society’s values rather than protecting fundamental human 
rights, or basic moral rights. Laws attempting to regulate private moral-
ity—individual choices about behavior that do not impact others—are 
based on societal opinions about virtue, which usually clash with respect 
for individual autonomy about choices for their personal behavior. 
F. The clash of morality and constitutionality 
Our legislative process generally results in the views of the ma-
jority becoming law, subject to compromises to build that majority. This 
process results in no one group getting everything they would prefer in 
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the legislation that ultimately passes. However, in addition to the give 
and take of political compromise, certain fundamental concerns—the 
basic human rights embodied in our federal constitution—limit our 
laws. Protection of these human rights trumps even the majority point 
of view.301 
Underlying the belief that certain basic human rights exist is the 
understanding that all human beings have the capacity to determine how 
they live their lives, and each person is entitled to “equal concern and 
respect in exercising that capacity.”302 This autonomy includes the right 
to make individual choices, whether rational or irrational, morally de-
sirable or morally wrong.303 This autonomy is so fundamental to what it 
means to be human that all humans are entitled to equal concern and 
respect in exercising their right to make such choices about their lives.304 
Consequently, when autonomous choices of individuals clash, the rights 
involved must be weighed against each other rather than evaluated 
based on the prevailing majority opinion about which right is more ap-
propriate.305 
Moral views must not be based on conventional wisdom or 
widely held opinions but on mutual respect for individual self-determi-
nation. In addition to protecting specific liberties like freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, equal protection, and due process, an un-
derlying theme of our constitution requires that the moral rights—fun-
damental human rights—of individuals cannot be violated even if the 
popular majority believe otherwise.306  The Supreme Court, as well as 
various state courts, have found restrictions on constitutional rights 
based on popular prejudices unconstitutional.307 For instance, in Loving 
v. Virginia the United States Supreme Court held that racial restrictions 
on the fundamental right to marry that were grounded in ideas about 
white supremacy were unconstitutional.308 Racial prejudice also played 
a major role in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), the 
Court’s decision that separate but equal public schools were unconstitu-
tional.309 In Brown II, which guided implementation of the Court’s orig-
inal order to integrate public schools, the Court stressed that “it should 
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go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles can-
not be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.”310 
More recently, in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court invali-
dated an amendment to the Colorado state constitution prohibiting any 
state, legislative, or judicial action that would provide protected status 
to any group of individuals based on their sexual orientation.311  Despite 
the amendment reflecting the majority viewpoint, demonstrated by its 
adoption by statewide referendum,312 the Court inferred the only reason 
for the amendment was animus against homosexuals and noted that an-
imus can never constitute a legitimate government interest.313 
State courts have also refused to allow majority popular opinion 
to infringe on fundamental rights. The Supreme Court of Alaska, ad-
dressing the constitutionality of a conviction for a “crime against na-
ture” pointed out that “we should avoid the fallacy that a rule of morality 
is necessarily a rule of law, or that the morality of some groups is, with-
out more, entitled to legal enforcement.”314 Concerning enforcement of 
the moral majority’s norms regarding sexuality, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court made it clear that “no sufficient state interest justifies leg-
islation of norms simply because a particular belief is followed by a 
number of people, or even a majority.”315 
All of these references to morality (moral rights, public morality, 
private morality) describe attempts to guide behavior.316 Noted legal 
philosopher H.L.A. Hart distinguishes between public morality that pro-
tects others from harm and private morality involving individual ac-
tions, usually in connection with decisions about sexual behavior.317 
Whether public or private, religious values most often ground these 
types of morality.318 As a result of differing ideas about religious values, 
 
310 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). 
311 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996). 
312 Id. at 623. 
313 Id. at 634.  
314 Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 645 (Alaska 1969). 
315 Pennsylvania. v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 49 (Pa. 1980). See also, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 
S.W.3d 332, 353 (Ark. 2002) (agreeing “that the police power may not be used to enforce a 
majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others”); Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 
S.W.2d 487, 498 (Ky. 1992) (recognizing the growing trend to reject widely held ideas about 
morality where the behavior being criminalized does not harm others), overruled by Calloway 
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Woodall, 607 S.W.3d 557, 568 (Ky. 2020); New York v. Onofre, 415 
N.E.2d 936, 942 (N.Y. 1980) (noting that majority disapproval of behavior cannot provide a 
valid basis for intruding on privacy rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution). 
316 Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts Morality’s Uni-
versal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1585–86 (2006). 
317 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 50–51, (Stanford Univ. Press 1963). 
318 See id.  
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conflicting opinions arise about whether behavior is morally acceptable 
or not.319 These conflicting views can provide a rationale for legislation 
that settles the dispute for the moment, yet can still be altered if the 
viewpoints leading to the legislation evolve.320  
When private morality or individual choice to behave in ways 
some consider lacking in virtue is the only rationale for legislation, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has held it unconstitutional.321 “Vice alone, without 
damage to others, has not been the subject of legitimate regulation.”322 
V. REASONS TO DECRIMINALIZE SEX WORK 
As Parts III and IV have explained, a number of legal theories 
would potentially support decriminalizing sex work. While these theo-
ries may occupy legal scholars, they do little to change the status quo. 
But practical reasons exist for decriminalizing sex work—reasons that 
can support efforts to change existing statutes and create additional pro-
tective legislation. Once changes to current laws get made, the legal and 
theoretical arguments become relevant to any challenges to the legisla-
tive changes. 
Among the many reasons to decriminalize sex work, this article 
will focus on two: 
1. Decriminalizing sex work reduces harm to sex work-
ers. 
2. Decriminalizing sex work assists with identifying 
and protecting victims of sex trafficking. 
A third important reason for decriminalizing sex work is that do-
ing so would allow resources to be shifted from surveillance and en-
forcement to assistance that helps provide other options than sex work 
to vulnerable persons. This article will not elaborate on that reason be-
cause it falls within a larger discussion of the benefits of restructuring 
the funding of law enforcement efforts. 
 
319 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 318, at 1584–85. 
320 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 318, at 1583–84. 
321 Anderson, supra note 302, at 648. 
322 Anderson, supra note 302, at 648.  
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A. Decriminalization will reduce harm to sex workers  
Decriminalizing sex work will make sex workers less vulnerable 
to abuse by clients, abuse by police officers, and abuse by society based 
on the stigma associated with a criminal record.323 
Sex work (prostitution) has been described as the world’s oldest 
profession.324 Whether criminalized or not it will continue to exist.325 
Those who engage in this work suffer a wide array of harms as a result 
of criminalization. 
When sex workers attempt to avoid arrest, or other entanglement 
in the criminal justice system, they are forced to engage in behaviors 
that increase their risk of harm. Knowing that one is risking arrest leads 
sex workers to choose to work in locations less visible to law enforce-
ment.326 This lack of visibility means more vulnerability to potential vi-
olence, whether from clients or those who see them as easy targets. Ac-
cording to a recent report published by the American Civil Liberties 
Union, there is “a strong association between rushing negotiation and 
experiences with client-perpetrated violence; [and] when sex work is 
illegal workers may not be able to as effectively screen clients or nego-
tiate fees or activities.”327 
Working in isolated areas also makes it more difficult for sex 
workers to watch out for each other. There is safety in numbers, a fact 
no less true for sex workers than others. Working in isolated areas to 
avoid detection means being unable to make use of others to offer assis-
tance. By being present in small groups, sex workers can offer each 
other assistance if things get out of hand, can protect personal property 
that may need tending to while a worker engages with a client, and can 
let others (including law enforcement if necessary) know if a situation 
becomes too dangerous.328 
 
323 Policy Brief: Impact of Criminalisation on Sex Workers’ Vulnerability to HIV and Violence 
2, NSWP GLOBAL NETWORK OF SEX WORKER PROJECTS (2018), 
https://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/impact_of_criminalisation_pb_prf01.pdf. 
324 RUDYARD KIPLING, ON THE CITY WALL: AND OTHER STORIES (Indian Railway Library 
1889). 
325 Alexandre, supra note 254, at 110. 
326 Policy Brief: Impact of Criminalisation on Sex Workers’ Vulnerability to HIV and Violence, 
supra note 325, at 3. 
327 ACLU, Is Sex Work Decriminalization the Answer: ACLU Research Brief 5, (2021), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_sex_work_decrim_re-
search_brief_new.pdf. 
328 Policy Brief: Impact of Criminalisation on Sex Workers’ Vulnerability to HIV and Violence, 
supra note 325, at 6. 
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Attempting to avoid the attention of law enforcement officers 
also leads sex workers to rush negotiations with potential clients so they 
avoid detection.329 This can lead sex workers to engage in behaviors that 
expose them to more potential for violence or to engage in more unpro-
tected sex because the client insists and threatens harm if refused.330 
Decriminalization of sex work would remove the continued po-
lice surveillance that forces sex workers to make decisions that increase 
their risk of harm. If avoiding detection was not a concern, sex workers 
could take as long as necessary to establish the terms of their interac-
tions with clients. By working in less remote areas with more opportu-
nities for others to observe violence or escalating behaviors that suggest 
impending violence, sex workers could decrease the chances of becom-
ing a victim. Eliminating the need to escape detection by working in 
isolation would also allow sex workers to utilize the informal support 
networks commonplace in most social settings—having a “wingman”331 
who can watch your back and provide support as needed.   
Once arrested, sex workers face additional harm as they make 
their way through the criminal justice system. Though some jurisdic-
tions have chosen to avoid prosecuting sex workers and have embraced 
a more rehabilitative approach,332 even under these alternative criminal 
justice systems, those caught up in the system suffer harm because the 
determination of whether someone will be funneled through the tradi-
tional criminal justice system or through the pre-arrest/pre-booking di-
version and rehabilitation programs is made by the same law enforce-
ment officers who often perpetrate abuse.333 
New York City provides an example of a diversion program. In 
2013, New York created the Human Trafficking Intervention Courts 
(HTIC), “a statewide system of courts, designed to intervene in the lives 
of trafficked human beings and to help them to break the cycle of 
 
329 Policy Brief: Impact of Criminalisation on Sex Workers’ Vulnerability to HIV and Violence, 
supra note 325, at 6. 
330 Policy Brief: Impact of Criminalisation on Sex Workers’ Vulnerability to HIV and Violence, 
supra note 325, at 6. 
331 Though “wingman” is often used in reference to men who use other male friends to more 
easily approach women, women often use female friends to create barriers that allow women to 
avoid or remove themselves from unwelcome interactions with men. See generally, Joshua M. 
Ackerman & Douglas T. Kenrick, Cooperative Courtship: Helping Friends Raise and Raze Re-
lationship Barriers, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1285 (2009). 
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exploitation and arrest.”334 Though the description refers to victims of 
trafficking in general, the courts were established to address prostitu-
tion-related offenses.335 From its inception, the HTIC system has con-
flated sex trafficking and prostitution or other forms of sex work and 
has considered all forms of sex work exploitative, violent, or both.336 
By offering services post-arrest, the HTIC system still leaves sex 
workers exposed to abuses by police officers. Even those who go 
through the HTIC system report being profiled or harassed.337 Many 
also become victims of false arrest, physical or verbal abuse, excessive 
force, and sexual assault (including rape).338 
Finally, even though many cases get resolved by a process where 
the court can suspend the charges and then dismiss them after a waiting 
period with no re-arrests, the waiting period is fraught with harm.339 
Once known to police officers, sex workers are more likely to be re-
arrested, thereby forfeiting the opportunity to have their original charges 
dismissed. Additionally, because they cannot engage in sex work with-
out risking arrest, those in the waiting period must find other ways to 
generate income, a task made more challenging by having an open crim-
inal case still pending.340 
B. Decriminalizing sex work assists with identifying and 
protecting victims of sex trafficking 
One of the tools used to make sex work more challenging was 
the enactment of legislation commonly referred to as 
SESTA/FOSTA.341 This legislation resulted from the consolidation of 
two similar bills: the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA) and 
the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA). The final legislation 
changes the federal Communications Decency Act that had previously 
prevented internet host providers from becoming criminally or civilly 
 
334 Id. at 23 (quoting Judge Jonathan Lippman). 
335 Id. at 25. 
336 Id. at 27. 
337 Id. at 45–46. 
338 Id at 46. 
339 Id. at 68 (explaining that this waiting period harms defendants who are over-policed and 
discriminatorily profiled; are noncitizens or undocumented; encounter access barriers such as 
housing and employment; or are legally vulnerable due to open cases). 
340 Id. at 50.  
341 The official name for SESTA/FOSTA is the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex 
Trafficking Act of 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 State. 1253 (2018). Some refer to the legis-
lation as FOSTA, some use SESTA, and some use SESTA/FOSTA. I am choosing to use the 
combined form, SESTA/FOSTA. 
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liable for content posted by others on their websites.342 With the enact-
ment of SESTA/FOSTA, internet host providers faced criminal or civil 
liability if material that facilitated or attempts to facilitate sex trafficking 
was posted on their platforms.343 SESTA/FOSTA created a new federal 
offense for anyone who “owns, manages, or operates an interactive 
computer service” that promotes or facilitates prostitution.344  Though 
SESTA/FOSTA does not criminalize sex work itself, it adds criminal 
penalties for others in ways that directly impact the ability of sex work-
ers to engage in their work. 
The expanding potential criminal and civil liability of internet 
host providers resulted in the rapid voluntary shut down of a number of 
sites and the removal of forums and websites that previously allowed 
sex workers to post information that helped them generate clients and 
protect themselves. The more consequential result of the passage of 
SESTA/FOSTA was that it forced many of those who had engaged in 
sex work indoors to return to the streets. This meant sex workers who 
had operated in relative safety now faced additional dangers. Though 
there were promises and expectations that SESTA/FOSTA would de-
crease prostitution and sex trafficking, instead, “[w]ithin one month of 
[SESTA/]FOSTA’s enactment, thirteen sex workers were reported 
missing, and two were dead from suicide. Sex workers operating inde-
pendently faced a tremendous and immediate uptick in unwanted solic-
itation from individuals offering or demanding to traffic them.”345 At 
the same time, advertisements and digital records that investigators had 
utilized to locate and rescue sex trafficking victims disappeared when 
internet hosting platforms shut down.346 
Before SESTA/FOSTA, internet platforms such as Craigslist 
and Backpage provided forums to promote a wide variety of sexual ser-
vices.347  Both Craigslist and Backpage provided forums to advertise 
 
342 42 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
343 18 U.S.C. § 2421A. 
344 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(a).  
345 Lura Chamberlain, Note, FOSTA: A Hostile Law with a Human Cost, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2171, 2174 (2019); see also Villarreal, supra note 260. 
346 Villarreal, supra note 260. 
347 Craigslist is a website that allows advertisements for a wide variety of items and services 
ranging from housing and jobs to services to items for sale or wanted to resumes and a discussion 
forums. See, e.g. CRAIGSLIST, https://vermont.craigslist.org/  (last visited June 7, 2021) (showing 
the various categories available for posting ads). Backpage was a “free classified advertisement 
service that operat[ed] very similarly to Craigslist. Users [could] place classified advertisements 
for a fee . . . and Backpage offer[ed] services for metropolitan regions across all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia, as well as several foreign countries.” Memorandum by Aravind 
Swaminathan & Catherine Crisham on Backpage.com Investigation to Jenny Durkan 1 (Apr. 3, 
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everything from cars, apartments, furniture, and antiques to specific 
forms of erotic or sexual services.348 Until the changes created by 
SESTA/FOSTA, the Communications Decency Act shielded the plat-
forms from civil or criminal liability.349 These platforms, along with 
many others, provided a way for content providers to communicate their 
messages to the public, but because the platforms did not create or sig-
nificantly edit the content, they did not become liable for any of the 
consequences of the messages themselves. 
When the advertisements for sexual services were easily acces-
sible to anyone, juxtaposed with advertisements for pets and baby sup-
plies, more people became aware of the robust sexual commerce indus-
try. And, predictably, more people became concerned about the sexual 
commerce industry.350 As members of the public were now able to see 
ads for sexual services, and potential customers were able to look for 
specific types of services, law enforcement officers were also able to 
monitor these ads. If a sex trafficker posted ads of victims to market 
them to potential customers, those same ads were visible to those look-
ing for victims to help them. In fact, according to investigation memos 
prepared by assistant U.S. attorneys for the Western District of Wash-
ington as part of an investigation into potential criminal charges against 
Backpage, the website’s posting rules for ads and reporting options for 
posted ads prohibited any that involved human trafficking.351 The re-
porting feature also provided specific details about how to report an ad 
that involved a threat to a child.352 
 
2012). Backpage was seized by the Department of Justice on April 9, 2018 and has not operated 
since that date. OFF. OF PUB.  AFFAIRS, DOJ, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT LEADS EFFORT TO SEIZE 
BACKPAGE.COM, THE INTERNET’S LEADING FORUM FOR PROSTITUTION ADS, AND OBTAINS 93-
COURT FEDERAL INDICTMENT (Apr. 9, 2018). 
348 See Backpage.com LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015). 
349 E.g. Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (2009) (holding that Craigslist was 
not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) as it does not “cause or induce anyone to create, post, or 
search for illegal content”); M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1058 
(holding that Backpage’s publication of images of a minor did not distinguish its actions from 
any other website that posted content that led to an innocent person’s injury). 
350 A.F. Levy, The Virtues of Unvirtuous Spaces, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 403, 409–10 (2017). 
351 Swaminathan & Crisham, supra note 349, at 3. 
352 Swaminathan & Crisham, supra note 349, at 3. In at least two places users were informed 
that ads exploiting a minor would be reported to law enforcement. The posting rules contained 
the following bold language: “Any post exploiting a minor in any way will be subject to criminal 
prosecution and will be reported to the Cyber tip line and law enforcement.” Swaminathan & 
Crisham, supra note 349, at 3. The “Report Ad” feature for a published ad provided “Inappro-
priate or Illegal Content” as the first option for reporting, telling users “If this involves a threat 
to a child or an image of child exploitation, please email abuse@backpage.com the URL of the 
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than & Crisham, supra note 349, at 6. 
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SESTA/FOSTA provides just one example of the way criminal-
izing sex work creates more harm than good. Though abolitionist advo-
cates assert that allowing ads for erotic services causes or increases hu-
man trafficking, the description of the way the most utilized service, 
Backpage, operated clearly demonstrates the opposite.353 Backpage, and 
other similar websites that previously allowed advertisements for erotic 
services made this industry more visible. But they also made it safer. 
And they made it easier for law enforcement to locate true victims of 
sex trafficking. 
Very little empirical data exists in connection with sex work be-
cause of its illegality. However, one study looked at the way online 
clearinghouses affected overall female safety by causing the reorgani-
zation of the way much sex work occurred.354 Conducted by researchers 
who focus on “causal impacts of policies, incentives, and actions by le-
gal and extra-legal actors on public safety,”355 the impact of social net-
working on people’s lives,356 and information technology,357 this study 
found that the introduction of the Erotic Services (ERS) advertisement 
category, caused a shift in the sex work industry. Available on Craigslist 
between 2002 and 2010, this category coincided with an increase in the 
number of sex workers who operated independently and a decrease in 
the number who operated on the streets.358 The study also found that 
during this same time period the rate of female homicides decreased by 
“as much as 10-17 percent.”359 The authors conclude that Craigslist’s 
Erotic Services pages “had a major disruptive effect on the market for 
commercial sex in the United States despite the nations’ prohibition of 
prostitution. It is likely that ERS reduced many dimensions of risk, and 
this, in turn, was responsible for both the market’s growth and the de-
cline in violence.”360  The data “support sex workers’ claims that intro-
duction of ERS made them significantly safer. [The authors] estimate 
that ERS led to a 10-17 percent reduction in female homicides.”361 
 
353 Swaminathan & Crisham, supra note 349, at 3. 
354 Scott Cunningham, Gregory DeAngelo & John Tripp, Craigslist’s Effect on Violence 
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C. Tools that assist sex workers also help police identify and 
protect victims of sex trafficking 
Backpage actually assisted with the enforcement of anti-traffick-
ing laws. The DOJ investigation report mentioned earlier explains that 
Backpage had, on many occasions, provided ads containing pictures of 
children or flagged as illegal to the local FBI agent in charge of locating 
victims of sex trafficking and had cooperated with requests to remove 
ads.362 The report also notes that Backpage screened for certain code 
words that would indicate potential trafficking and required credit cards 
for payment, which allowed law enforcement access to additional infor-
mation about the person paying for the ad.363 
The investigative report notes that Backpage actively assisted 
with law enforcement by responding to approximately 100 subpoenas a 
month, often providing responses within an hour of receipt of the sub-
poena, cooperating with requests to remove ads or posts alerting users 
about potential sting operations, and providing other ongoing assistance 
to law enforcement throughout investigations and trials.364 In a follow-
up investigation dated nine months later, the assistant U.S. attorneys 
noted that “Backpage was making substantial efforts to prevent criminal 
conduct on its site, that it was coordinating its efforts with law enforce-
ment agencies and [the National Center for Missing and Endangered 
Children]” and that it followed the advice of its attorneys.365 
When analyzing potential litigation strategies, the second of the 
investigation memos identifies the variety of ads that are similar to pros-
titution, but not illegal.366 This list includes “pay[ing] actors to have sex 
in a film . . . [and] be[ing] a ‘sugar daddy’—offering to take care of 
someone in exchange for companionship.”367 It is also legal to “simulate 
sex for a fee, to dance or perform solo sex acts, to provide companion-
ship, and to give ‘sensual’ massages.”368 “Posing in sexually explicit 
 
362 Swaminathan & Crisham, supra note 349, at 7; see also Taylor Goebel, Sex Trafficking: 
Backpage Gone, But Note the Problem, DELMARVA NOW (Feb. 7, 2019, 6:23 AM), 
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365 Memorandum from John T. McNeil & Aravind Swaminathan, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, on 
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2 (Jan. 16, 2013) (on file with author). 
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positions or . . . giving hands-on therapy” is also legal.369 As these in-
vestigators note, and many of those who have argued for criminalization 
ignore, “while someone who has little experience with the adult services 
market may readily conclude that Backpage’s escort advertisements of-
fer prostitution services, such a conclusion is not so plain after one rec-
ognizes how much sexually explicit commercial conduct is lawful.”370 
D. Reducing police surveillance reduces harm 
In addition to the potential for harm from clients that criminali-
zation exacerbates, sex workers face harm from law enforcement offic-
ers themselves.371 Abuse from the police in exchange for avoiding arrest 
can take the form of extortion involving money or information or can 
be more of a quid pro quo—a sex act in exchange for avoiding arrest for 
prostitution.372 Decriminalizing sex work would remove the ability of 
police officers to extort or abuse sex workers in exchange for not arrest-
ing them. 
According to a sex worker-led study using data collected from 
surveys of online sex workers and those who work on the streets, inter-
actions with police range from threats of violence to sexual harassment 
to rape.373 A survey of sex workers in Baltimore, Maryland reported 
“that 78 percent had experienced at least one abusive encounter with the 
police.”374 An investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice supports sex workers’ ex-
periences. In that investigation, the DOJ found that officers routinely 
ignored reports of sexual abuse made by sex workers.375 More shock-
ingly, the investigation also found evidence that the Baltimore police 
officers coerced sex workers into exchanging sex acts to avoid arrest, 
and when reported, failed to investigate, allowing the conduct to re-
cur.376 According to the report, one sex worker told investigators “that 
she met with a certain officer and engaged in sexual activities in the 
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375 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 10 (2016). 
376 Id. at 149. 
ANDERSON 
128 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 21:1 
Currency or immunity from arrest.’”377 The investigation ended without 
interviewing the officer and resulted in no actions.378 
The same officer had additional complaints levied against him, 
of the same nature.379 The department investigated the complaints, but 
those doing so took almost a year to investigate one complaint, so 
charges were never brought, and the next investigation, which ulti-
mately led to the officer’s resignation, took an additional six months.380 
In many states, individuals can be arrested for loitering for pur-
poses of prostitution.381 In New York, police make these arrests based 
on observations of criteria that are all legal activities. Arrests can be 
based on things such as standing somewhere other than a bus stop or 
taxi stand, carrying money or sexual paraphernalia,382 being with some-
one who has previously been arrested for prostitution, wearing provoc-
ative or revealing clothing, or engaging with passers-by.383 
Another example of the increased interaction sex workers have 
with law enforcement was described in an article about Georgia’s law 
prohibiting loitering for purposes of prostitution.384 Similar to New 
York’s law, the Georgia statute allows police to use activities such as 
being a known prostitute, engaging in conversations with passers-by, or 
attempting to stop passing cars, as evidence of intent to commit prosti-
tution.385 Using criteria like this, police arrested a person for carrying 
condoms and dressing as a woman when the identification the person 
carried identified the individual as male.386 As a result, the court sen-
tenced the individual to 20 days in jail or a $200 fine,387 yet none of the 
underlying activities are illegal. 
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In addition to the ability to make arrests simply by observing 
seemingly innocent behavior, some police departments add a financial 
incentive by paying overtime when officers make arrests that require 
them to work extra time taking care of processing and paperwork.388 
According to a former New York Police Sergeant, “[u]nits that involve 
a lot of arrests, like vice and narcotics, are known destinations for over-
time pay. ‘It’s called collars for dollars,’ . . . ‘The more bodies you put 
in the van, the more overtime there was.’”389 Overtime can affect an 
officer’s pension, which in some situations is based on the years the of-
ficer made the highest salary.390 Overtime pay is used to encourage ar-
rests and increase numbers.391  
ProPublica reported one story of the kind of abuse sex workers 
experience at the hands of police. It describes a recording of an interac-
tion between an undercover police officer and a woman who police 
eventually charged with prostitution.392 ProPublica noted that the re-
cording was unusual because these types of recordings are not usually 
made public.393 This one is worth sharing in its entirety: 
In October 2018, Undercover 157 knocked on the door 
of an East New York apartment six weeks after someone 
complained that the woman inside was selling sex. The 
27-year-old single mother had lived there for eight 
months after years of instability and stints in a shelter. 
Through the door he tried to convince her to do business. 
“Excuse me,” she replied, “I said no. I do not know you. 
I have children here. No.” 
In the recording, she could be heard saying ‘no’ or ‘bye’ 
or telling him to leave 12 times. At one point, the con-
versation went silent and she seemed to step away. His 
loud knocking resumed. “Yo!” he called out. She replied. 
“Stop knocking on my door.” 
He persisted, feigning exasperation until she gave in. It’s 
unclear from the recording who brought up money first, 
but eventually she asked him how much he had. He 
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increased his offer until she agreed to let him in, raising 
the cash in front of her peephole at her request. 
An infant could be heard crying in the background as he 
asked for anal sex. She told him she didn’t want to be 
hurt. “Are you going to be rough?” she asked. 
She checked on the baby, who was now screaming. Then 
came another knock on the door, a banging this time. 
The backup team stormed in. One shouted at her to get 
on the floor. She was so panicked, she said, she urinated 
on herself. 
At least five cops were involved in the arrest. She was 
charged with prostitution and endangering the welfare of 
a child. The city’s welfare agency removed her children 
and she lost custody for two months.394 
Removing the criminal aspect of sex work would protect sex 
workers from the harm they suffer at the hands of the police. The com-
bination of almost-anything-counts standards for prostitution-related ar-
rests and the financial incentive for high numbers of arrests means sex 
workers are easy prey. And, as noted earlier, even if a sex worker is not 
arrested, the potential for extortion, harassment, and physical abuse at 
the hands of police officers looms large. 
VI. THE PATH FORWARD 
Many reasons exist to decriminalize sex work. Maintaining the 
criminal nature is simply a moral imperative of a portion of society. It 
appears rooted in animus toward those who disagree, and especially to-
ward those who choose to engage in sex work. Additionally, sex work-
ers have a liberty interest in making decisions about their behavior and 
their bodies; criminalizing sex work infringes on this liberty interest. 
As noted by the U.S. Department of Justice itself, of all the sim-
ilar forms of commercial erotic services, only sex work gets singled out 
as criminal. 395 Other sexual behaviors that are not commercial, such as 
adultery and sodomy, have been decriminalized. And, according to a 
study supported by the Whitman-Walker Institute, the Georgetown Uni-
versity O’Neill Institute of National and Global Health Law, and HIPS, 
a non-profit focused on health rights of sex workers, there is evidence 
that “criminalization of sex work contributes to community violence, 
propagates crime, blocks access to public health resources, is an 
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ineffective deterrent to participation in sex work, and is deeply harmful 
to sex workers.”396 It appears that criminalizing sex work may not only 
have little effect on human trafficking but may make it more challenging 
to see and prevent trafficking. Finally, criminalizing sex work harms 
those who engage in such conduct in ways that make it more difficult to 
remove themselves, as well as puts them at risk of additional harm.397 
In a 2015 article analyzing the conflict among feminists regard-
ing the appropriate way to advocate for decriminalizing sex work, Pro-
fessor Adrienne Davis suggests the multiple feminist positions within 
the pro-sex-work group must coalesce or the pro-sex-work movement 
will remain stalled.398 Davis delves into the various positions, describ-
ing the arguments that sex work is a form of labor or a choice of occu-
pation that should be regulated399 and that sex work, because it involves 
sex and women’s choices about sex, should be decriminalized com-
pletely.400 Others point out the tensions between advocates who seek to 
reform the way we address sex work but do so with different arguments 
and at least somewhat different results.401 Still others focus on decrimi-
nalizing victims of trafficking, which leads to support for the Nordic 
model, which criminalizes the purchase of sex, but not its sale.402 
Scholars will continue to debate the appropriate path forward at 
the leisurely pace typical of academic discourse. But, at the same time, 
sex workers have made their wishes clear. Sex workers want their trade 
decriminalized—not regulated, not partially decriminalized so only the 
purchase of sex is illegal—fully decriminalized so they can operate 
without fear of arrest, without the harms that come from criminalization, 
and without the stigma associated with activities legal to offer yet illegal 
to partake in.403 According to Red Canary, a grassroots organization of 
sex workers and sex worker allies, “[t]he goal of decrim[inalizatio] is to 
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allow for self-determination, and for the industry to be worker-run and 
led.”404 
This article has identified a number of arguments for decrimi-
nalizing sex work, as well as the prominent opposing positions. Many 
of the arguments scholars make are based on legal theories that will al-
most always have multiple interpretations. Whether a fundamental right 
to engage in sex work exists will generate debate until the Supreme 
Court hears a case where that is the primary issue. Taking a case from 
inception to the Supreme Court is highly unlikely, especially when so 
many intermediate courts and state supreme courts appear to accept the 
overly ambitious interpretation of dicta in cases that have addressed 
similar, but not identical issues. This challenge becomes even more dif-
ficult by the fact that cases that could put the issue before the Court 
involve sex workers, who are almost always marginalized and lacking 
in resources. 
If the Supreme Court ever accepted a case presenting the right 
to engage in sex work, the Court would likely have to consider the var-
ious purported justifications for maintaining the criminal nature of sex 
work. The evaluation of the purported justifications—even if only to 
establish a rational relationship between the criminal statute and the 
state interest in enforcing it—is also relevant to an alternative method 
for bringing about the decriminalization of sex work—legislative ef-
forts. 
Only in the last few years has there been any momentum behind 
legislative efforts to decriminalize sex work. Though a legislative glitch 
allowed legal indoor sex work in Rhode Island for several years, that 
result was unintended.405 However, as federal efforts to enhance sex 
trafficking enforcement have increased, subsuming consensual com-
mercial sex work in those efforts, legislatures in a number of jurisdic-
tions have seen a variety of proposals to decriminalize sex work406 or to 
study whether it should be decriminalized.407 To date, none of these pro-
posals have been enacted, but support is growing. 
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Even the current Vice President of the United States, Kamala 
Harris, a former prosecutor instrumental in the efforts to shut down 
Backpage, has now endorsed the need to decriminalize sex work.408 
And, though neither bill was enacted, several proposals for federal leg-
islation related to studying sex work and decriminalization were intro-
duced in 2019.409 Additionally, the platform of the Democratic Social-
ists of America, a growing movement within the Democratic Party, 
included a resolution supporting the decriminalization of sex work,410 
and several prosecutors have announced that they will not prosecute 
prostitution charges and support decriminalizing prostitution.411 
Professor Adrienne Davis’ assertion that the pro-sex-work 
movement has stalled may be accurate if we limit our observations to 
academics and scholars.412 But, at the grassroots level, the movement is 
strong and growing. And it is time for the scholarly discussion to recog-
nize that movement and amplify the voices of those most affected.  
The grassroots efforts of sex workers are similar to those of the 
gay and lesbian community as members of that community worked to-
ward achieving marriage rights. Like the opposition pro-sex work advo-
cates face today, those who fought for same-sex marriage faced opposi-
tion rooted in religious beliefs, assertions of morality, and fear. 
The grassroots efforts leading to same-sex marriage began with 
small groups discussing possibilities.413 It grew to a more organized ef-
fort that focused first on helping those involved understand how to ef-
fectively advocate.414 Doing so required building consensus about goals 
and expectations before any efforts to influence others began. Like the 
efforts to decriminalize prostitution, the same-sex marriage movement 
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had several unsuccessful efforts in the courts before recognizing that it 
would take legislative action in each state to achieve its goal.415 
The decriminalization movement has reached that point. Efforts 
are underway to propose legislation.416 Advocates are speaking with 
similar voices and a unified message, staying focused on the reasons to 
decriminalize sex work. Alliances are building. Though some disagree-
ment among sex workers and former sex workers about whether decrim-
inalization is truly the right move still exists, those who support the de-
criminalization effort are coalescing around a unified message, 
advocating for full decriminalization rather than legalization or partial 
decriminalization (also known as the Nordic model). 
The next steps pose challenges. To build support for legislative 
change, sex workers and their allies must counter the emotion-laden im-
ages and stories told by abolitionists. They must not only point out the 
flaws in these messages, but they must also personalize their own sto-
ries, letting people see who they are, what they do, why they do it, and 
how they engage in society when they are not working. 
Though the ultimate goal may be the decriminalization of all 
forms of sex work, it may be possible to garner more support, more 
quickly for a transitional step toward that result. Like the same-sex mar-
riage movement did by accepting civil unions as an interim step toward 
the final result, decriminalization advocates may find it useful to offer 
an interim step by focusing on decriminalizing indoor and online sex 
work. 
The most vocal critics of sex work have been successful at blur-
ring the lines between consensual sex work and human trafficking. Ac-
cording to some reports, the sex workers most vulnerable to being traf-
ficked are those who work on the streets.417 Even sex workers who 
engaged in consensual sex work when it was safe to conduct their busi-
ness online have acknowledged that returning to doing business on the 
streets makes them more vulnerable to those who want to traffic them.418 
Removing the prohibition against online advertising and allowing sex 
workers to legally advertise, screen, and provide support to each other 
online and indoors will also make it easier for law enforcement to locate 
those who are being trafficked in that manner, just as they were doing 
when Backpage was operating and cooperating. Removing the criminal 
liability for consensual commercial adult sexual behavior out of the 
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public eye would put sex work in the same category as any other con-
sensual adult sexual behavior, none of which is legal to conduct on the 
streets.  
The most obvious difference between commercial street-based 
sex work and non-commercial, consensual sexual behavior would be 
that the transactional details would be limited to indoor spaces. Whereas 
it is entirely possible, and legal, for a person to proposition another out-
doors and in public, doing so as a commercial exchange would remain 
illegal.  The effect of this distinction on neighborhoods where street sex 
work is common would mean that sex workers would no longer spend 
time in the neighborhood looking for clients. Removing them from the 
neighborhoods would likely go a long way toward appeasing those who 
believe that sex workers attract a criminal element. 
Allowing sex work conducted indoors and online would mean 
the repeal of statutes making commercial sex interactions illegal. It 
would also require the repeal of provisions of FOSTA/SESTA that make 
it illegal to engage in online advertising or any online behavior that en-
courages or facilitates commercial sex. Human trafficking statutes and 
other criminal statutes that penalize those who benefit from transactions 
involving commercial sex would need alterations to become more pre-
cise about focusing only on human trafficking. 
In addition to removing or significantly revising criminal stat-
utes, it would be important to affirmatively prohibit discrimination 
against those who engage in legal commercial sex. Doing so would pre-
sumably prevent banks from refusing to allow transactions related to 
commercial sex, landlords from refusing to rent to those who work as 
commercial sex providers, and employers from refusing to hire someone 
who has or still is, engaged in commercial sex. Rather than having stu-
dents removed from educational programs because they do sex work to 
support themselves while in school, or courts remove children from par-
ents who engage in commercial sex to provide for their families, those 
who make this choice would be treated in the same way another who 
chooses to work as a waitress or factory worker, or any other type of 
worker would be treated. The sex worker would be no different from the 
medical model who allows students to poke and prod their sexual organs 
to learn how to provide appropriate medical care. They would be no 
different from those who become gestational surrogates, allowing the 
use of their body to create a child for another party, or for a professional 
athlete who is paid for using his or her body to entertain fans. 
And, most importantly, by decriminalizing commercial sex 
work, even if doing so requires that it not be conducted on the streets, 
we will recognize that those who engage in this work have the right, the 
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liberty interest, and potentially the privacy interest, to engage in this be-
havior, just as anyone who engages in this behavior without the com-
mercial aspect has the right to do so. It’s time to act. 
 
 
 
